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NOTES
AIR CARRIERS' LIABILITY UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION AFTER FRANKLIN MINT V. TWA
The Warsaw Convention of 19291 (Warsaw Convention, Convention)
establishes rules of liability and limitations of liability for international
air carriage.' The Convention's authors promulgated the Convention to
establish uniform rules insuring adequate and reliable recovery for in-
jury to persons or property' and to protect the infant airlines industry
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (United States ratification effective as of October 29, 1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw
Convention].
2 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARv. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967) (Warsaw Convention created to establish uniform system
of international aviation law and to limit potential liability of carriers in case of accidents).
See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-39, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIA-
TION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 941-52 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT]. The Warsaw Convention was the product of two international
conferences, one held in Paris in 1925 and the other in Warsaw in 1929. See Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra, at 498. Although the United States sent an observer to the Warsaw
Convention, the United States was not one of the Convention's charter members. See id.
at 501-02 (Convention's seven charter members). Shortly after the Convention became
effective, however, the State Department determined that the provisions of the Conven-
tion would benefit American carriers and passengers and transmitted approval to Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt. See id. at 502. (airlines' strong support of Warsaw Convention
prompted State Department to advocate adherence to Convention). In 1934, President
Roosevelt submitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. Id.; see
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES, S. ExEC. DOC. No. G,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in part inn re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April
22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1982) letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull
recommended ratification of Convention because Convention's liability limitations would
aid development of American airlines industry) [hereinafter cited as Hull Letter]; infr4 note
4 (discussion of Hull Letter); see also U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2 (President must submit treaties
to Senate for Senate's advice and consent). After the Senate ratified the treaty by voice
vote, President Roosevelt filed notice of the United States' adherence to the Convention
with the Polish government, pursuant to Article 38 of the Convention. 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876 (1934) (United States adheres to Convention); see Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. 38(2) (Article 38 provides that country becomes party to Warsaw Convention by
filing notice of adherence with Polish government); DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra, at
964-67 (130 nations that are currently signatories to Warsaw Convention). See generally Note,
The Revised Warsaw Convention and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CuM. L. REV. 763 (1978)
(history of Warsaw Convention).
' See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.) (authors of Warsaw Convention
desired to establish uniform body of liability rules governing international aviation that
would supersede conflicting domestic laws), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); see also
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from ruinous damage suits.' Article 22 of the Convention (Article 22) limits
a carrier's liability to 250 gold francs per kilogram for damage to or loss
MINUTES, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, October 4-12,
1929, WARSAW, 35 (R. Horner and D. Legrez trans. 1975) (statement of British delegate)
(major reason for Convention was creation of uniform system of liability) [hereinafter cited
as MINUTES]; id. at 64 (statement of Italian delegate) (emphasized importance of arriving
at uniform liability rule); id. at 87 (statement of French delegate) (Convention's aim is to
achieve unity of law in international air transport). The Convention's authors believed that
establishment of a uniform system of liability would protect plaintiffs from the vagaries
of foreign legal systems and thus insure that aggrieved plaintiffs receive adequate compen-
sation. See id. at 40-41 (statement of French delegate) (creation of uniform system of liabil-
ity rules guarantees adequate recovery to passengers and shippers); id. at 46 (statement
of Italian delegate) (establishment of uniform liability rules necessary to protect passengers).
Confronted with a maze of conflicting foreign laws, the authors devised a uniform system
of liability rules governing the fundamental aspects of international air disaster litigation.
See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1092; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. Article 1 of
the Warsaw Convention provides that the Convention applies to all international transpor-
tation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. Id. Under Article 17,
a carrier is liable for any injuries a passenger sustains while embarking or disembarking
from the carrier. Id. art. 17. Under Article 18, a carrier is liable for all damage to goods
occurring during transportation by air. Id. art. 18. See generally id. art. 20 (burden of proof);
id. art. 22 (damage awards); id. art. 25 (standard of negligence); id. art. 28 (venue).
' Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978); see Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 1, art. 22 (Convention's liability limitation); Hull Letter, supra note 2,
at 3. In a letter from Warsaw to the United States Senate, Secretary of State Hull emphasized
the importance of the liability limitation provision in the Warsaw Convention. See id. Hull
stated that Article 22 would benefit passengers and shippers because the liability limita-
tion would afford a definite basis of recovery and thus lessen litigation. Id. The liability
limitation would also aid the development of international air transport by affording air
carriers a more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates. Id. Hull
presumed that the certainty would result in lower operating expenses, thereby benefiting
both travellers and shippers with reduced transportation costs. Id.
Article 22 provides that a carrier's liability cannot exceed 250 Poincar6 gold francs
per kilogram in cases involving damage to or loss of goods and 125,000 Poincar6 gold francs
per passenger in cases involving death or injury to passengers. See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 22. The Poincar6 gold franc was a French monetary unit that contained
a fixed amount of gold and was convertible into any national currency. See Asser, Golden
Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis,
5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 645, 645 (1974) (1928 French law set gold value of franc at 65.5
milligrams of gold of millesinal fineness of nine hundred); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 2, at 499 n.10 (125,000 Poincar6 gold francs equaled approximately $4,900 in
1929). A carrier only may limit liability for a passenger's injuries if the ticket the carrier
delivers to the passenger clearly states that the transportation is subject to the Conven-
tion's liability limitations. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3. Compare Seth v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302, 307 (1st Cir. 1964) (court limited carrier's
liability because passenger received ticket explaining Convention's provisions) with War-
ren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965) (court refused to limit car-
rier's liability because passengers that received tickets on plane lacked opportunity to read
tickets before plane departed). A carrier also cannot take advantage of the Article 22 liability
limitations if the carrier's willful misconduct caused the injury to the passenger or the
damage to the goods. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1); see also Bank of
Nova Scotia v. Pan American World Airways, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,378, 17,380 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (carrier could not limit liability because loss of gold was reasonably forseeable conse-
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of goods and 125,000 gold francs per person for injury to passengers.5 The
authors chose gold as the monetary unit establishing the liability limita-
tions because gold's official price formed the basis for the international
quence of employee's recklessness); Olshin v. EL AL Israel Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH)
17,463,17,464 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (elements of willful misconduct). Finally, a carrier cannot con-
tract for a limit of liability lower than the limit established by the Convention. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, art. 23(2); see also Saiyed v. Transmediterranean Airways, 509
Supp. 1167, 1169 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (tariff void under Article 23 because tariff relieved car-
rier of liability for damages otherwise recoverable under Article 22); infra text accompany-
ing note 74 (Article 23).
' See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22; see also infra notes 19-23 and accom-
panying text (legislative history of Article 22). The authors of the Warsaw Convention pur-
posefully established a low liability limitation to protect the infant aviation industry from
the excessive damages that might result from a catastrophic accident. Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499; see supra note 4 (Article 22). In the 1950's, however, the
parties to the Convention expressed dissatisfaction with the low liability limitations that
Article 22 had established. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON Two RELATED PROTOCOLS
To THE CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING To INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE By AIR, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STATE DEPARTMENT
LETTER]. In 1955, the parties to the Convention convened in Hague to consider a United
States proposal to raise the Convention's liability limitations. Id. at 5. Although the Hague
Protocol doubled the Article 22 liability limitation to approximately $16,600, the United
States Senate refused to ratify the Protocol because the Senate believed that the Protocol's
liability limitation remained too low. Id.; see Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Con-
vention, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955), reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at
955-69 [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol]. The United States subsequently attempted
to raise the Article 22 liability limitation to $100,000 per passenger. STATE DEPARTMENT
LETTER, supra, at 6. Other countries, however, resisted the United States' efforts to raise
the liability limitation. Id. The United States, therefore, filed a notice of denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention in 1966 to become effective six months after the filing date. Id.;
see Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 39 (party to Convention may denounce Conven-
tion on six months notice); 50 DEFT STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965) (notice of denunciation).
To avoid the United States' denunciation, the parties to the Warsaw Convention met
in Montreal and enacted an agreement that provided for a passenger liability limit of $75,000
per passenger in cases of personal injury or death on all international flights into or out
of the United States. See Montreal Agreement, approved by Exec. Order No. 23680, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 971-72
[hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement]; STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER, supra, at 6 (United
States withdrew denunciation after Montreal Agreement became effective). The Montreal
Agreement is an inter-carrier arrangement that operates under a provision in Article 22
allowing a carrier to contract with a passenger for a higher limitation of liability than the
limitation established in the Convention. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22[2];
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 972-73 (list of airlines that have signed Montreal
Agreement). In raising the ceiling on plaintiff's recovery in personal injury cases, the Mon-
treal Agreement created a system of no-fault liability. See Montreal Agreement, supra, at
971 (carrier cannot absolve itself from liability by showing that carrier took all necessary
measures to avoid passengers injuries). The Montreal Agreement, however, did not change
the liability limitations established by the Convention for cases involving loss of injury
to cargo. See id.
The parties to the Warsaw Convention modified the Convention's liability limitations
twice after the Montreal Agreement became effective. See STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER,
supra, at 6-7. In 1971, Warsaw parties adopted the Guatemala City Protocol, which raised
the liability limitations for cases involving passengers to approximately $100,000. See
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monetary system at the time.' Currently, gold lacks an official price and
Guatemala City Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization fICAO) Doc. No. 8932
(1971), reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 975-84. The Guatemala City
Protocol amended Article 22 and replaced the Poincar6 gold franc as the Convention's unit
of conversion with the price of gold at the date of judgment. Id. at 978. The United States
signed but never ratified the Guatemala City Protocol. See STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER,
supra, at 6; Matusco-Matte, Should The Warsaw System Be Denounced or Integrated?, 5 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 201, 216 (1980) (majority of parties to Warsaw Convention have refus-
ed to ratify Guatemala City Protocol).
In 1975, the Warsaw parties met in Montreal and again reconsidered the Convention's
liability limitation. See STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER, supra, at 7. The Montreal Conference
determined that gold was an unsatisfactory unit of conversion and substituted the Special
Drawing Right (SDR) as the Convention's unit of conversion in the Montreal Protocols.
See Montreal Protocols 3 and 4, art. II, VII, reprinted in DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 2, at 985-1001 [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocols]; infra note 6 (gold's status as
international unit of conversion diminished during 1970's); infra note 13 (SDR); infra notes
29-34 and accompanying text (Montreal Protocols). The SDR is an international reserve
asset that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created to replace gold as a unit of con-
version. See infra note 13 (SDR); infra note 14 (IMF); see also Tobolewski, The Special Draw-
ing Right in liability conventions: An acceptable solution?, 1979 LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L.Q.
169, 176 (one SDR equaled approximately $1.20 in 1975). The Montreal Protocols raised
the Article 22 liability limitation to approximately $120,000 in personal injury cases and
$21 per kilogram in cargo cases. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MONTREAL AVIA-
TION PROTOCOLS 3 AND 4, S. EXEC. REP. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 2 (discussion of Montreal Protocols). The United
States Senate, however, rejected ratification of the Montreal Protocols on March 8, 1983.
See 29 CONG. REC. § 2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (50 to 42 vote in favor of Montreal Pro-
tocols was 12 votes short of two-thirds majority required for ratification; see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, S 2 (treaty not ratified unless two thirds of Senators present vote in favor
of treaty); infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (legislative history of Protocols' rejec-
tion). The Montreal Agreement, as opposed to the Montreal Protocols, thus currently
establishes air carriers' liability limitations in the United States in cases involving injuries
to passengers on international flights. The Warsaw Convention still establishes the limita-
tion of carriers' liability in cases involving damage to or loss of goods.
6 See Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc-A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. &
L. COM. 73, 94-95 (1974) (countries used gold as standard for measuring value of national
currencies in 1929). When the United States joined the Warsaw Convention in 1929, an
ounce of gold was worth approximately $20. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2,
at 499 n.10 (125,000 Poincar6 gold francs equaled approximately $4,900 in 1929). In 1934,
however, the official price of gold in the United States rose to $35 an ounce because the
United States devalued the dollar. See Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, S 12,
48 Stat. 337, 342 (repealed 1976). The price of gold remained at $35 an ounce until the early
1970's, chiefly because the United States joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in 1945. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 790-171, § 2, 59 Stat. 512, -
(1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 5 286 (1976)) (authorized United States' entry into IMF). The
IMF is an international organization that assists members in financing payment deficits
and monitors members' exchange rates and policies. See Southard, The Evolution of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 5 N.C.J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 425, 439 (1980) (IMF created to
monitor changes in exchange arrangements between members); infra note 14 (discussion
of IMF). When the United States joined the IMF, the United States promised to maintain
the value of United States dollars in terms of gold. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act,
Pub. L. No. 790-171, S 62, 59 Stat. 512, - (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. S 286 (1976)). The
price of gold remained stable because IMF nations used the $35 rate in gold transactions
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is an ordinary commodity subject to market price fluctuations.' Despite
the market fluctuations in the price of gold, the parties to the Warsaw
Conventioji have not replaced gold with another unit of conversion to deter-
mine air carriers' liability limitations.' The parties' failure to amend the
Warsaw Convention to take account of the change in gold's status thus
raises the question of what unit of conversion a court should use to con-
vert Convention judgments into United States dollars.9
in the open market and because the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 prohibited citizens from
buying and selling gold. See Asser, supra note 4, at 664 (IMF countries stabilized gold price
at $35 per ounce); see also Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, S 3, 48 Stat. 340,
- (repealed 1976).
The demise of the gold standard began in the 1950's when a persistent balance of pay-
ment deficit in the United States led to a shortage in American gold reserves. See P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 690-91 (1970) (gold reserve dropped from $24 billion to $10 billion
between 1955 and 1968). To diminish the effect of the depletion of the United States' gold
reserve, IMF countries discontinued buying and selling gold on the free market in 1968.
See Asser, supra note 4, at 650. By discontinuing the supply of gold to the free market,
the countries created a two-tier system of gold pricing. Id. The IMF countries retained
the official price of gold for transactions among central banks and at the same time established
a free market price of gold that fluctuated according to supply and demand conditions.
Id. The free market of price of gold increased dramatically and in 1971 the United States
suspended its commitment to convert dollars to gold. See Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed.
Reg. 11,437 (1971) (United States suspended conversion of dollars into reserve gold assets);
see also SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, PAR VALUE MODIFICA-
TION ACT, S. REP. No. 678, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (suspension of convertible dollars aimed
at slowing deterioration of United States gold reserves), reprinted in 1972 US. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2209, 2212.
To curtail the rise in the free market price of gold, the United States devalued the
dollar in 1972 and increased the official price of gold to $38 an ounce. See Par Value Modifica-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116, 116 (1972) (repealed 1976). The United States
again devalued the dollar in 1973 and the official price of gold increased to $42.22. See Par
Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, S 1, 87 Stat. 352, 352 (1973) (repealed 1976).
In 1976, however, Congress repealed the official price of gold, primarily because the disparity
between the official gold price and the free market gold had grown to such an extent that
the official gold price no longer reflected the true value of gold. See Bretton Woods Agree-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 5 286 (Supp. V
1981)) (repeal of Par Value Modification Act); see also SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT-
TEE, BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT ACT, S. REP. No. 564, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Senate
replaced gold with SDR as international unit of conversion), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEwS, 5935, 5938; infra note 13 (SDR).
" See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1982)
(free market price of gold is daily fluctuating price of commodity), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186); see also Gold Tumbles $100 in a Week, Wash. Post,
March 1, 1983, at D7, col. 3 (free market gold price dropped $100 in one week in 1983 because
of mass unloading by speculators and investors).
' See Matusco-Matte, supra note 5, at 219 (Poincar6 gold franc remains Warsaw Con-
vention's unit of conversion because only seven countries have ratified Montreal Protocols);
supra note 5 (Montreal Protocols); see also Martin, The Price of Gold and The Warsaw Con-
vention, 4 AIR L. 70, 76 (1979) (ratification of Montreal Protocols is not imminent in near
future).
I See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 305-06 (2d Cir. 1982)
(change in international monetary system since creation of Warsaw Convention presents
1983] 1467
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American courts have considered converting Convention judgments
with reference to several different standards, including the last official
price of gold,10 the free market price of gold,11 the current exchange value
of the French franc," and the Special Drawing Right (SDR).1' The SDR
problem of how to enforce Article 22), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983)
(No. 82-1186). The United States Constitution provides that treaties ratified by the Senate
are the law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court consistently has held
that courts must enforce treaty provisions since treaties are the equivalent of national legisla-
tion. See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 654, 657 (1853) (court's duty is to interpret treaty
and administer treaty according to treaty's terms); Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 299,
314-15 (1829) (court must enforce treaty because treaty is equivalent of national legislation).
Courts, therefore, must enforce the Warsaw Convention's provisions since the Convention,
as a federal treaty, has the force of federal law. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093
(2d Cir.) (Warsaw Convention is supreme law of land), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Smith
v. Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971) (Warsaw Convention is equal
in stature and force to domestic laws of United States).
11 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp.
833, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (court used last official price of gold to calculate defendant's liabili-
ty limitation), affjd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Par Value Modifica-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, S 1, 87 Stat. 352, 352 (1973) (repealed 1976) (last official gold
price was $42.22 per ounce); supra note 6 (history of official gold price).
See Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp.
344, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (free market price of gold is proper unit for converting Article
22 judgments into United States dollars), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1982);
see also Gold Tumbles $100 in a Week, Wash. Post, March 1, 1983, at D7, col. 3 (free market
gold price fluctuated from $850 an ounce in January, 1980 to $400.50 an ounce in March, 1983).
" See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airline!, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,509, 18,513 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dicta) (court calculated defendant's liability with reference to value of cur-
rent French franc); see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1980, at 43, col. 5 (1980 value of current
French franc was approximately $.24).
" See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (SDR is logical replacement for gold as Convention's unit of conversion) (dicta), aff'd,
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186).
The IMF created the SDR in 1969 to replace gold as the principal international reserve
asset. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, effective Dec. 27, 1945,
60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (1947), as amended July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T.
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266 (1976) and April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S.
No. 8937 (1978), arts 8, 9 (objective of IMF articles is to make SDR principal reserve asset
in international monetary system) [hereinafter cited as Articles]. See generally Ward, The
SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 1-30
(1981) (explanation of SDR). Central banks of countries that are members of the IMF ex-
change SDRs for convertible currencies. Id. at 2. Banks transfer SDRs by debiting the SDR
account of the user and crediting the SDR account of the receiver, with the user country
acquiring convertible currency from the receiving members. Meier, The "Jamaica Agree-
ment, " International Reform and the Developing Countries, 11 J. INT'L L. & Con 67, 80 (1976).
SDR balances, therefore, are actually lines of credit against which banks may borrow reserves.
See Ward, supra, at 2. The five convertible currencies, which banks use to transfer SDRs,
are the French franc, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling, the Deutsche mark, and the
United States dollar. Id. at 3. The IMF officially replaced gold with the SDR as the interna-
tional unit of conversion. See Jamaica Agreement of 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.iA.S. No. 8937
[hereinafter cited as Jamaica Accords]; P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 612 (1980) (SDRs are foun-
dation of contemporary international system of finance). See generally Gold, Development
[Vol. 40:1463
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is the artificial monetary unit used by countries that are members of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to convert foreign currencies into
national currency equivalents.' 4 Since the values of the conversion units
range from the last official gold price, $42.22 an ounce, to a free market
gold price that has exceeded $850 an ounce, a carrier's liability varies
greatly depending on which unit a court selects to enforce Article 22.5
Notwithstanding the disparate liability limits arising from the use of dif-
ferent units of conversion, American courts have selected inconsistent units
to calculate carriers' liability under Article 22.16 The judiciary's inability
of the SDR as Reserve Asset, Unit of Account, and Denominator: A Survey, 16 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 2 (1981) (history of SDR); Merren, The SDR as a Unit of Account in
Private Transactions, 16 INTL LAWYER 503 (1982) (development of SDR as principle unit
of account for international transactions).
" See surpa note 13 (SDR); see also Southard, supra note 6, at 426 (discussion of IMF).
The IMF is an international institution possessing broad powers to guide the financial con-
duct of member countries and to give or withhold financial assistance. Id. The IMF's Ar-
ticles of Agreement provide that the purpose of the institution is to monitor changes in
international monetary arrangements and to provide financial resources to assist members
with payment inbalances. See Articles, supra note 13, art. 1; see also Bretton Woods Agree-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 790-171, § 2, 59 Stat. 512, - (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 5 286
(1976) (United States joined IMF). See generally Articles, supra note 13, art. 15 (146 members
of IMF include most western countries except Switzerland and Soviet Bloc countries).
," See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F.Supp.
833, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); supra notes
6 & 7 (history of fluctuations in official and free market gold prices). In Warsaw Crash,
the district court noted the variations arising from the use of the alternative conversion
units proffered by the parties. See Warsaw Crash, 535 F. Supp. at 841 n.6. The court deter-
mined that had the Senate ratified the Guatemala City Protocol, a carrier's liability in a
personal injury case would amount to $100,000 if the Court used the last official gold price
as the unit of conversion. See id.; supra note 5 (Guatemala City Protocol). The court stated,
however, that use of the free market gold price would raise the liability limit set forth
in the Protocol to approximately $1,400,000. See Warsaw Crash, 535 F. Supp. at 841 n.6;
infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (discussion of Warsaw Crash case).
" See Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G., v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239-40
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (court determined that last official gold price is Convention's unit of conver-
sion); Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) (court used last official gold price to calculate liability limit); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(court used last official gold price), aff d on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); Boehr-
inger Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp 344, 353 n.48
(S.D. Tex. 1981) (court used last official gold price of approximately $400 an ounce to calculate
Article 22 liability limitation), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1982); Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines (Franklin Mint ), 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (court used last official gold price), afj'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines,
15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18, 509, 18,513 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dicta) (court used value of current
French franc); Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp. v. The Flying Tiger Line, Index
No. 784512 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco, Aug. 25, 1982) (court used last official gold price);
see also Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 n.12 (2d Cir.) (dicta) (court suggested that proper
unit of conversion is last official gold price), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). But see Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines (Franklin Mint II), 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982)
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to select a standard unit of conversion frustrates the purpose of the War-
saw Convention since the Convention's authors drafted Article 22 to in-
sure uniform limitations of carriers' liability.
17
Most courts that have considered the proper unit of conversion for
Article 22 have attempted to adopt the unit that the courts believe is
most consistent with the intent of the authors of the Warsaw Convention.18
(Article 22 is unenforceable in cases involving damage to or loss of cargo because alter-
native units of conversion are unacceptable), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14,
1983) (No. 82-1186); In re Aircrash at Kimpo Int'l Airport, Korea on November 18, 1980,
558 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (court relied on Franklin Mint II decision and declared
Article 22 unenforceable in cases involving death or injury to passengers). See generally
infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text (discussion of Franklin Mint I); infra notes 55-68
and accompanying text (discussion of Franklin Mint II); infra notes 77-87 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of Boehringer); infra note 88 (discussion of Kern); infra notes 88-97 and
accompanying text (discussion of Deere); infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of Warsaw Crash); infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Kimpo).
"T See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (purposes of Warsaw Convention); infra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text (Convention's authors intended to establish fixed liabil-
ity limitations).
"8 See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1982)
(court rejected use of French franc as unit of conversion because framers of Warsaw Con-
vention explicitly rejected use of single national currency as unit of conversion), cert. granted,
51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw,
Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (framers of Warsaw Con-
vention deliberately sought to avoid using one country's currency as unit of conversion),
affd. on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (drafters of Warsaw
Convention picked gold as unit of conversion because of gold's stability and tendency to
reflect real values better than currency), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1982).
The majority of courts that apply the provisions of the Warsaw Convention use the Con-
vention's legislative history to insure uniform application of the Convention's provisions.
See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088-91 (2d Cir.) (Convention's legislative history indicates
that authors intended Article 22 to limit liability of carrier's employees), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Na~ionale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-51 (5th Cir.
1967) (court examined Convention's legislative history to determine meaning of "carrier"),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); ef. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812-15 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Convention's legislative history indicates that Article 28(1) makes venue proper
in country where passenger purchases ticket if carrier has place of business in same country).
In Choctcaw Nation of Indians v. United States, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use
of a treaty's legislative history as an aid in interpreting the treaty. See 318 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1943) (courts must look at legislative history of treaty to determine intentions and understand-
ing of parties to treaty); see also Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d
1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977) (treaty interpretation involves consideration of legislative history
and intent of contracting parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES S 147 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (courts should look to circumstances atten-
ding negotiation of international agreement to ascertain parties' intent) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT]. In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court offered other guidelines for
interpreting treaties. See Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (courts inter-
preting treaties should look to intent and purposes of parties); Pigeon River Improvement,
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 158-63 (1934) (conduct of parties
subsequent to ratification of treaty is relevant when interpreting treaty's provisions); Fac-
tor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933) (courts should afford opinions of Executive
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The Convention's legislative history indicates that the authors believed
that Article 22 was the most important provision in the Convention. 9 The
authors purposefully enacted a low liability limitation to allow airlines
to attract investors that otherwise might be unwilling to risk capital that
could be lost in one catastrophic accident." The authors attempted to off-
set the low liability limitation, however, by requiring courts to shift to
the airlines the burden of showing that the airlines could not have taken
any actions to avoid the damages or injuries. 21 Although subsequent con-
ferences have raised the ceiling on the Convention's liability limitations,'
the parties to the Convention never have abandoned the basic principle
that carriers' liability should not exceed a fixed and definite sum.'
To insure stable liability limits, the Convention's authors chose gold
as the Convention's unit of conversion, reasoning that the use of a fixed
gold price would provide more predictable liability limitations than would
the use of national currencies subject to unilateral devaluation.' Since
Branch much weight when interpreting treaties); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921)
(courts should construe a treaty like any other contract). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra,
§ 147 (criteria for interpreting treaties).
11 See MINUTES, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Convention's reporter) (carrier's
liability is fundamental matter of Convention); id. at 36-37 (statement of Russian delegate)
(Article 22 is most important provision of Convention); id. at 205 (statement of Italian delegate)
(provisions concerning carrier's liability limitations are most important articles of Conven-
tion); see also H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL Am LAW 1 (1954) (limiting
carriers' liability was principal goal of Warsaw Convention's provisions); A. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAW § 2.1 (1981) (Convention's authors' most important goal was to limit poten-
tial liability of carriers in case of accidents).
20 See L. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 11.01 [2] (1982) (Warsaw Convention's
liability limitation provision enacted to mitigate airlines' principal problem, accumulating
capital in face of enormous risks); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499 (Warsaw
authors hoped liability limit would attract capital that otherwise might be scared away
by risk of large aviation accidents); see also Hull Letter, supra note 2, at 4 (Secretary of
State Hull claimed that low liability limit would lead to reduction of operating expenses
for carriers).
21 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20 (burden of proof on carrier to show
that carrier took necessary measures to avoid damage caused); see -also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 500 (transmittal from United States delegation indicated Con-
vention framers balanced low liability provision by shifting burden of proof to carrier to
show lack of negligence). But see Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, at 1 (Montreal Agree-
ment created system of absolute liability on all flights entering or leaving United States
by eliminating Article 20).
See supra note 5 (history of Article 22).
See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.) (parties to Convention continue to
believe that Convention's fundamental purpose is to fix carriers' liability), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 922 (1977).
24 See DRION, supra note 19, at 183 (Warsaw authors selected gold as Convention's
unit of conversion to avoid effects of devaluations that would result from using national
currencies to calculate liability limits); Heller, The Warsaw Convention and the "Two-Tier"
Gold Market, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L., 126, 129 (1973) (Warsaw authors chose gold as unit of
conversion because of gold's stability and tendency to reflect real values); see also MINUTES,
supra note 3, at 89-93. The minutes of the Warsaw Convention indicate that a French represen-
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the official gold price and the free market gold price were virtually the
same in 1929, the authors did not contemplate any problems arising from
the use of gold as the Convention's unit of conversion.25 The IMF subse-
quently instituted a system of international currency exchange whereby
the IMF assigned each member nation a par value for the nation's curren-
cy based upon the dollar value of gold at an official price maintained by
the United States." In the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, an inter-
national gold crisis led to a wide divergence in the rates of the official
gold price and the free market gold price." In order to ensure flexibility
in exchange rates and to insulate monetary transactions from the unstable
free market gold prices, the IMF replaced gold with the SDR as the inter-
national unit of account in 1978.' On the same date that the IMF's adop-
tion of the SDR became effective, the United States abolished the official
price of gold, primarily because of the wide disparity between the official
gold price and the free market gold price.'
Prior to Congress' repeal of the official gold price, American courts
consistently used the official gold price to calculate carriers' liability under
Article 223 Nevertheless, the existence of a higher free market price
tative originally proposed the French franc as the Convention's unit of conversion. See id
at 89-90. A Swiss representative, however, argued against the adoption of a national cur-
rency like the French franc because a country could modify a national currency without
the approval of the Convention's parties. Id. The Swiss representative instead proposed
the Poincar6 gold franc as the Convention's unit of conversion because the Poincar6 franc
corresponded to a set weight of gold. See id. at 90-91. The representatives at the Conven-
tion overwhelmingly accepted the Swiss proposal and expressed the Convention's liability
limit in terms of the gold franc. See id.; supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text (Article
22 refers to gold as Convention's conversion unit); see also Serbian Loans Case (Fr. v. Serb.),
1929 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at - (Judgment of July 12) (court determined that par-
ties to international agreements selected Poincar6 gold franc as agreements' unit of con-
version because gold franc maintained standard of value), reported in 2 WORLD COURT
REPORTS 394-401 (M. Hudson, ed. 1935). See generally Asser, supra note 4, at 64546 & 646
n.2 (Poincar6 gold franc selected as conversion unit for majority of multilateral transporta-
tion conventions promulgated after 1924).
' See Heller, supra note 6, at 81 (1974) (prior to 1960's free market gold price stabilized
at same value as official gold price).
' See Heller, supra note 24, at 78-80 (discussion of par value system); supra note 6
(history of gold).
" See supra note 6 (history of gold).
" See Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, Apr. 1, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (Jamaica Accords abolished official
price of gold and replaced gold with SDR as international unit of account); supra note 6
(history of gold); supra, note 13 (SDR).
I See U.S.C. 286a (Supp. V 1981)(United States rescinded official gold price of effec-
tive date of Jamaica Accords); supra note 6 (history of gold).
' See Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, 369 F.2d 874, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1966) (court utilized
official gold price to limit defendant's liability to $8,300 when actual damages equalled
$375,000); Danzinger v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,261, 17,264
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court used official gold price to calculate defendant's liability for undelivered
baggage in case arising before repeal of official gold price); Sadie 01shin v. EL AL Israel
Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,463, 17,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court utilized official gold price
to limit defendant's liability to $700 when actual damages equalled $1,100,000).
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raised the possibility that courts might use the free market price as the
Convention's unit of conversion to avoid the Convention's low liability
limitations." Concerned that the existence of a free market gold price
might lead to inconsistent application of Article 22, the Warsaw parties
convened in Montreal in 1975 to consider replacing gold as the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion.' The representatives at the Montreal Conference
determined that use of SDRs to calculate carriers' liability limitations
would provide the uniform limits that had attracted the Convention's
authors to choose gold as the Convention's unit of conversion.3 Accord-
ingly, the representatives drafted the Montreal Protocols to substitute
SDRs for gold as the Convention's .conversion unit.'
Although United States leadership was instrumental in the drafting
of the Montreal Protocols,35 the United States Senate refused to ratify
31 See Note, Legal Problems in Compensation Under the Gold Clauses of Private Inter-
national Law Agreements, 63 GEo. L.J. 817, 829-30 (1975) (existence of two-tier gold system
allowed courts to use either official gold price or free market gold price to enforce liability
limitation clauses that used Poincar6 gold franc as unit of conversion). Compare Hornlinie
v. Societe Nationale des Petroles Aquitaine, Judgment of April 14, 1972, Supreme Court,
Neth. 1972 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [N.J.] - (Dutch High Council converted judgment
under analagous limitation provision of shipowners' liability convention with reference to
official gold price) with Sago v. Sagoland, Judgment of Oct. 2, 1973, Lower Court, Goteburg,
Sweden 1973 - - (Swedish court calculated defendant's liability with reference to
free market price of gold) and Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., Judgment of February
15, 1974, Ct. of App. 3d Dep't, Athens, 1974 - - (court calculated carriers' liability
under Warsaw Convention with reference to free market gold price).
' See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-4 (Warsaw parties convened at Montreal
Conference because parties recognized that demise of gold standard required new method
for currency conversion); Revised Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at 790 & n.154 (strong
possibility that courts would use free market gold price to calculate Convention judgments
encouraged Warsaw Parties to reconsider viability of gold as conversion unit at Montreal
Conference); see also Tobolewski, supra note 5, at 173 (almost all representatives at Mon-
treal Conference agreed that gold was unacceptable unit of conversion).
See 29 CONG. REC. S2239 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy) (War-
saw parties substituted SDR as Convention's unit of conversion because SDR is far more
stable unit of conversion than gold or any other currency); see also Detailed Report of the
United States Delegation International Conference of Air Law held under the auspices of
the.International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal 17 (1975) (United States promotion
of SDR led to overwhelming support for adoption of SDR as Convention's unit of conver-
sion); Gaynes, Memorandum, Bureau of Int'l Aviation, Civil Aeronautics Board (April 18,
1980) (parties at Montreal Conference rejected free market gold price in favor of SDR)
[hereinafter cited as Gaynes Memo]; supra note 5 (Montreal Conference).
I See Montreal Protocols 3 and 4, supra note 5, art. 22 (Protocols amended Convention
to substitute SDR as Convention's unit of conversion). See generally Fitzgerald, The Four
Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime Governing International Car-
riage By Air, 42 J. AiR L. & Com. 273, 273-91 (1976) (discussion of Montreal Protocols).
I See President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Protocols to the Convention
on International Carriage by Air, III PUB. PAPERS-GERALD FORD 2933-34 (January 14, 1977)
(United States was leader in efforts that resulted in adoption of Montreal Protocols 3 and
4) [hereinafter cited as Ford Message]; see also MONTREAL'REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (United
States initiated movement to substitute SDRs for gold as Convention's unit of conversion).
The Montreal Protocols were the results of over two decades of efforts by the United States
to change the Warsaw Convention to provide greater protection to shippers and passengers.
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the Protocols on March 10, 1983 .6 The primary reason for rejection of
the Protocols was opposition to an absolute ceiling that the Protocols placed
on the amount of damages recoverable by plantiffs. The legislative history
of the Senate's action, however, indicates that even though the Senate
rejected the Montreal Protocols, the political branches of the government
approve of the concept of limited carrier liability in international aviation.'
Id. at 5. The Protocols created a system of no-fault liability that increased the amount plaintiffs
could recover under Article 22 to approximately $120,000 in personal injury cases and $21
per kilogram in cases involving damage to cargo. Id. at 4-5; see Montreal Protocol No. 3,
supra note 5, art. II (carrier's liability cannot exceed 100,000 SDRs in cases involving death
or injury to passengers); Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 5, art. VII (carrier's liability
cannot exceed 17 SDRs in case of damage to or loss of cargo); supra note 5 (one SDR equaled
approximately $1.20 in 1975). But see 29 CONG. REC. S2248 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings) (liability limitation established in Montreal Protocols equalled
approximately $109,000 in 1983 because value of SDR had dropped to $1.09). In addition,
the Protocols included a Supplemental Compensation Plan that provided an additional
$200,000 of recovery for loss of life. See Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 5, art. 38;
MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (Supplemental Compensation Plan). The Protocols
also included a settlement inducement clause designed to force airlines to settle claims
within 6 months by subjecting the airlines to added costs if in a subsequent trial a court
awards more than the airline's offer. See Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 5, art. II.
Because of the changes incorporated into the Protocols, the Protocols received the strong
support of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. See "International No-Fault" Would
Fix Liability in Airline Crashes, Wash. Post, March 2, 1983, at A22, col. 1; see also Ford
Message, supra, at 2294 (recommended that Senate approve Montreal Protocols moderniz-
ing Warsaw Convention); Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to Howard
Baker (June 22, 1982) (Reagan administration supports Protocols), reprinted in 29 CONG.
REC. S2238 (daily ed. March 7, 1983). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also strongly
approved the Protocols. See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee voted 16-1 in favor of Protocols).
1 See 29 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (50 to 42 vote in favor of Mon-
treal Protocols was 12 votes short of two-thirds majority required for ratification).
1 See Air Liability Treaty Rejected by Senate, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1983, at D6, col.
5 (rejection of Protocols result of opposition to absolute ceiling on plaintiffs' recovery); see
also 29 CONG. REC. S2278 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden) (recommended
rejection of Protocols because Protocols established system of absolute liability); id. at S2245
(daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (advocated rejection of Protocols for
failure to provide adequate compensation for personal injury claims). The Montreal Pro-
tocols altered the Warsaw Convention by eliminating a clause in the Convention that allowed
plaintiffs to avoid the convention's liability limitations by proving that a carrier's willful
misconduct caused the injuries. See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; supra note 4
(willful misconduct clause). The opponents of the Protocols claimed that the elimination
of the willful misconduct clause unfairly disadvantaged plaintiffs by precluding recoverable
damages in excess of $320,000. See 29 CONG, REC. S2245 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings). To support the position that the Protocols were unfair to passengers,
the opponents demonstrated that plaintiffs had recovered as much as $1 million from negligent
airlines in cases involving carriers' willful misconduct. Id. But cf. id. at S2237 (daily ed.
March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (85% of personal injury recoveries would fall below
$320,000 level authorized by Protocols).
See 29 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (majority of Senators voted in
favor of Montreal Protocols); supra note 35 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee almost
unanimously agreed with Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations' support of United States
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The effect of the rejection is that the Convention's gold clause remains
in force. 9 The lack of uniformity characterizing Article 22 liability limita-
tions undoubtedly will continue because each court will select the conver-
sion unit that the court considers best as a matter of judicial policy.40 Since
the rejection of the Protocols offers little guidance about the proper unit
of conversion, the starting point for determining the proper conversion
unit is to examine the decisions of the courts that have considered alter-
native units of conversion for enforcing Article 22.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York was the
first American court to address the proper unit of conversion after gold
lost its official value.41 In Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
ratification of Montreal Protocols); see also MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (limita-
tions of airline liability are fact of life in international aviation law); cf. In re Aircrash in
Bali, Indonesia, on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (Congress has had
ample time to reconsider Warsaw Convention but has effected no changes). The Senate
debates over the Montreal Protocols indicate that the majority of Senators favored the
United States adherence to the Warsaw Convention since the Convention provides a uniform
system of liability for international air travel. See 29 CONG. REC. S2271 (daily ed. March
8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Danforth) (United States participation in Warsaw Convention
inures to benefit of American citizens because Convention guarantees protection to
Americans should aviation accident occur in foreign country); id. at S2238 (daily ed. March
7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy) (Convention provides system of uniform, predictable, and
worldwide liability coverage); id. at S2260 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassen-
baum) (Convention resolves potential conflict of law issues of enormous proportions). The
Senators generally recognized that the liability limitation established in Article 22 was
fundamental to the Convention. See id. at S2271 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (statement of
Sen. Danforth) (almost all foreign countries that are parties to the Convention oppose unlimited
carrier liability); id. at 2238 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kassenbaum) (prin-
ciple of limited liability is tradeoff for uniform and predictable coverage provided by Con-
vention). Consequently, the majority of Senators approved of the concept of a liability limita-
tion in international air travel. See id. at S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (majority of Senators
favored Montreal Protocols). Even the proponents of the Warsaw Convention, however,
acknowledged that the Convention's current liability limits are unreasonably low and thus
advocated an increase in the amount plaintiffs could recover under Article 22. See, e.g.,
id. at S2277 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S2271 (statement
of Sen. Danforth) id. at S2270 (statement of Sen. Kassenbaum).
I See supra note 5 (Article 22 uses Poincar6 gold franc as Convention's unit of
conversion).
41 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (American courts have enforced Article
22 inconsistently).
", See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (court utilized last official gold price to calculate defendant's liability), affjd 690 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186); see also
McGilchrist, The Gold Franc in the United States After Franklin Mint, 1982 LLOYD'S MAR.
& COM. L.Q. 281, 281 (Franklin Mint I was first American decision to address proper unit
of conversion for Article 22). Prior to the Franklin Mint I decision, two courts had assumed
alternate units of conversion for purposes of Article 22. Compare Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079, 1089 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) with Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia
Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,509, 18,513 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The issue in Reed was whether an airline employee sued by the survivors of American
passengers killed in the crash of a Trans World Airlines (TWA) jet in the Aegean Sea could
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Inc. (Franklin Mint I),42 the plaintiff contracted with Trans World Airlines
(TWA) for the carriage of 714 pounds of numismatic materials from the
United States to England. 43 During the course of delivery, the materials
were either lost or stolen." Franklin Mint sued TWA for $250,000, the
alleged value of the materials, and TWA sought to limit its liability by
invoking Article 22.
The parties in Franklin Mint I recognized the need to adopt a unit
for converting Article 22 judgments into United States dollars and offered
four alternative units of conversion.4" Franklin Mint argued that the court
should use the free market price of gold to calculate TWA's liability
because the free market price is the only gold price currently in existence.
4
1
TWA, on the other hand, proposed the SDR, the last official price of gold,
and the current value of the French franc as alternative units of
conversion.4' After considering the alternatives, the district court accepted
TWA's position that the SDR was a logical unit of conversion since the
SDR has replaced gold as the international unit of account.49 The Franklin
invoke Article 22 to limit the employee's liability. See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1081. The Second
Circuit determined that Article 22 protected an airline's employees and held that a plaintiff
may not recover greater damages from an employee than the plaintiff could recover from
the airline. Id. at 1093. In a footnote to the opinion, the Reed court limited the defendant's
liability as if the Guatemala City Protocol had been in effect. See id. at 1089 n.12; supra
note 5 (United States never ratified Guatemala City Protocol). The Reed court assumed
that the free market price of gold was the proper unit of conversion because the Protocol
provided that courts should calculate the liability limitations with reference to gold value
at the date of judgment. Id.; see Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 352 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (court determined that Reed language was dicta
and therefore not authoritative), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1981); see
also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1982) (court
rejected dicta in Reed), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3887 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186).
In Kinney, the district court calculated defendant's liability with reference to the value
of the current French franc. See Kinney, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,513 n.9 (dicta) (court utilized
value of French franc to limit defendant's liability to $60 per kilogram of goods). The Kin-
ney court's calculation was also dicta since the damages sought by the plaintiff amounted
to less than the defendant's liability limitation calculated with reference to any of the alter-
native units of conversion. Id. Moreover, the Kinney court did not explain why it choose
the French franc as the unit of conversion. See id.
2 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert granted,




See id. at 1289.
4, Id.; see Brief for Appellant at 8-15, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) (free market gold price is Warsaw Convention's unit of conver-
sion because free market price is only gold price still in existence).
" See Franklin Mint I, 525 F. Supp. at 1289; McGilchrist, What is the Poincari gold
franc worth?, 1982 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 164, 171 (TWA's counsel advocated use of
SDR); see also Brief for Defendant at 4-6, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (TWA claimed that SDR was proper unit of conversion
because SDR has replaced gold as international unit of account).
41 See Franklin Mint I, 525 F. Supp. at 1289.
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Mint I court ultimately held, however, that the last official price of gold
was the proper unit for calculating Convention judgments.' The Franklin
Mint I court based its decision on a 1974 order by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the federal regulatory agency for the airlines industry, that
directed airlines to file tariffs with the CAB using the last official gold
price to calculate the airlines' liability limits." The Franklin Mint I court
reasoned that absent a presidential or congressional declaration on a
replacement for gold as the proper unit of conversion under Article 22,
the CAB's utilization of the last official price of gold was the closest ap-
proximation of a governmental interpretation of Article 22.52 The court
See id. In holding that the last official gold price was the proper unit of conversion,
the Franklin Mint I court declined to set forth its reasoning in detail. Id. Instead, the court
stated that it adopted TWA's arguments supporting use of the last official gold price. Id.;
see supra text accompanying note 48 (TWA argued that last official gold price was one
alternative unit of conversion). TWA had argued that the last official gold price was a viable
unit of conversion because use of the last official gold price effectuated the Warsaw Con-
vention's authors intentions to provide stable and uniform liability limits. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 15, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186) [hereinafter
cited as Petition for Certiorari]. TWA also argued that use of the last official gold price
to calculate TWA's liability was proper since the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) permits
carriers to calculate liability limitations with reference to the last official gold price. Id.;
see infra note 51 (CAB). In addition, TWA contended that the court should use the last
official gold price because shippers and carriers adopt the last official gold price as the
Convention's unit of conversion in contracts of carriage. See Petition for Certiorari, supra,
at 15.
51 525 F. Supp. at 1289; see Civil Aeronautics Board Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526
(1974) (CAB directed airlines to calculate liability limitations with reference to official price
of gold as established in 1973); supra note 6 (Congress raised official price of gold to $42.22
an ounce in 1973); see also 14 C.F.R. § 221.38(j) (1982) (carriers must publish liability limita-
tions in tariffs). See generally Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §5 1382, 1386 (Supp.
V 1981) (CAB authorized to coordinate and review international airline matters and
agreements). Prior to Congress' repeal of the official gold price in 1978, the CAB required
airlines to calculate liability limitations with reference to the official price of gold. See 37
Fed. Reg. 11,385 (1972) (carrier's liability for damaged goods was $7.52 per pound); CAB
Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974) (CAB required carriers to file tariffs using official
gold price of $42.22 an ounce). When Congress abolished the official gold price in 1978 the
CAB did not revise its 1974 order. See Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 352 (S.D. Tex. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th
Cir. Feb 2, 1982). A 1981 internal memorandum, however, stated that the CAB should con-
tinue to require carriers to use the last official price of gold to calculate liability limitations
to fulfill the United States' obligation to enforce the Warsaw Convention. See Bureau of
Compliance and Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronautics Board, Memorandum on Warsaw
Convention Liability Limits at 5 (May 20, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 CAB memo]. The
CAB has not reversed its 1973 revised order and has continued to require carriers to use
the last official gold price to calculate liability limits. See In re Air Crash Disaster At War-
saw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 843 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affid on other
grounds 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983). But cf. Civil Aeronautics Board Order 81-3-143, Docket
39243 (March 29, 1981) (CAB allowed British Caledonian Airways Limited to increase its
liability limit for personal injury to 100,000 SDRs).
' See 525 F. Supp. at 1289 (CAB is government agency most intimately concerned
with limiting carriers' liability under Warsaw Convention), aff'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186).
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also reasoned that the parties had intended to adopt the last official price
of gold as the basis for converting the Article 22 limitation into dollars
since TWA had filed tariffs with the CAB that complied with the 1974
directive.' Under the Franklin Mint I decision, TWA's liability limit was
approximately 6,500 dollars.'
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Franklin Mint I1)A5 In the most
significant portion of the Second Circuit's decision, the Franklin Mint 11
court declared the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations prospective-
ly unenforceable in the United States.58 The Second Circuit reasoned that
the very convening of the 1975 conference that promulgated the Mon-
treal Protocols indicated that the parties to the Warsaw Convention
recognized that the change in gold's status had eliminated the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion.57 Although the Second Circuit recognized that
the lack of an internationally agreed upon unit of conversion did not
necessarily preclude enforcement of Article 22, the court stated that a
unit of conversion is enforceable in United States courts only if the Senate
Id.; see supra note 51 (CAB rulings).
See 525 F. Supp. at 1289.
690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No.
82-1186).
1 See id. at 311 (Warsaw Convention's limits on liability for loss of cargo unenforceable
in United States). In determining that Article 22 is unenforceable in cases involving loss
of or damage to cargo, the Franklin Mint I court limited its holding to liability arising
from events occurring at least 60 days after issuance of the opinion. Id. at 311-12. The Franklin
Mint I court stated that because other courts had adopted alternative units of conversion,
litigants in cases involving the Convention could not have expected the Franklin Mint I
court's holding. Id. at 312; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (nonretroac-
tive application of holding compelled in case of first impression if parties could not have
foreseen holding). The Franklin Mint 11 court reasoned that prospective application of the
court's holding was necessary to give the parties covered by the Convention time to adjust
to the holding. 690 F.2d at 312. The Franklin Mint 1I court determined that courts should
use the last official price of gold as the unit of conversion for purposes of Article 22 until
the court's holding took effect. See id. (last official gold price was appropriate unit of con-
version because carriers had relied on CAB ruling to calculate liability limitations with
reference to last official gold price); see also supra note 51 (CAB rulings).
V See 690 F.2d at 309; supra notes 29-38 & accompanying text (Montreal Protocols).
In Franklin Mint I4 the Second Circuit stated that the Jamaica Accords destroyed the
international arrangements that led the Warsaw Convention's authors to select gold as
the Convention's unit of conversion. See 690 F.2d at 309; supra note 13 and accompanying
text (Jamaica Accords substituted SDR for gold as IMF's unit of account); see also supra
note 24 and accompanying text (Convention's authors chose gold as Convention's unit of
conversion because gold was internationally approved conversion unit). To support the court's
position that no internationally approved unit of conversion exists, the court noted that
the parties to the Convention use a variety of units of conversion. See 690 F.2d at 308-09.
In addition, the Franklin Mint II court stated that although TWA's liability limit ranged
from $6,500 to $400,000 depending on the conversion unit used, courts have used each alter-
native unit proffered by the parties to calculate carriers' liability under Article 22. See




has ratified a treaty that approves the unit of conversion or if both Houses
of Congress have passed legislation approving the unit of conversion.
58
The Franklin Mint II court determined that the legislative repeal of the
official price of gold in 1978 indicated that Congress had abandoned the
Warsaw Convention's unit of conversion." Since the judiciary lacked the
authority to adopt a new unit of conversion, the Franklin Mint II court
held that the Convention's liability limitation was unenforceable.
0
Although the Franklin Mint II court declared Article 22 unenforceable
in United States courts, the Second Circuit discussed the viability of the
alternative conversion units proffered by the parties. 1 First, the Second
Circuit declared that Congress' repeal of the official price of gold reflected
a legislative reluctance to base liability limitations on a commodity lack-
ing a specific value.2 The court, therefore, rejected use of the last official
price of gold as the unit of conversion on the grounds that use of the
last official price of gold would contravene the intention of the Conven-
tion's authors to use a unit of conversion that maintains the level of liability
limitation at a specific value." Second, the Franklin Mint II court rejected
the free market price as a unit of conversion because the free market
price fluctuated daily.' The court stated that a decision to base the liability
limitation on the free market price would contravene the intention of the
Convention's authors to adopt a stable unit of conversion." The Second
Circuit also rejected use of the current French franc as the unit of con-
version since the authors of the Convention wanted to avoid reliance on
a single national currency, which could be subject to unilateral action."
690 F.2d at 311.
See id. (Congress' repeal of Par Value Modification Act was explicit abandonment
of previously established unit of conversion); supra note 6 (repeal of official gold price).
I See 690 F.2d at 312 (substitution of new unit of conversion is political question unfit
for judicial resolution).
61 See id. at 309-11 (Franklin Mint II court rejected alternatives proffered by parties).
6Id.
See id. (Convention's authors selected gold as unit of conversion to establish liabili-
ty limit at specific value). In Franklin Mint II, the Second Circuit disapproved of the CAB's
position that the last official price of gold was the proper monetary unit for converting
Convention judgments because Congress had repealed the official gold price. See id at 309-10
(Second Circuit declared that law of inertia was sole criterion supporting CAB's use of last
official gold price).
Id. at 310.
6 See id. In Franklin Mint I, the plaintiff claimed that the Second Circuit's dicta in
Reed supported application of the free market gold price to calculate TWA's liability limit.
See id. at 310 n.22; supra note 37 (Reed court calculated defendant's liability with reference
to free market gold price). The Franklin Mint II court stated that the Reed decision implied
a free market standard under the Guatemala City Protocol. 690 F.2d at 310 n.22; see supra
note 5 (Guatemala City Protocol). Since the United States never ratified the Guatemala
City Protocol, the Franklin Mint 11 court rejected the plaintiffs claim that Reed had deter-
mined that the free market gold price was the Warsaw Convention's unit of conversion.
See 690 F.2d at 310 n.22 (court rejected Franklin Mint's reliance on Reed dicta).
" 690 F.2d at 310; see supra note 24 (Warsaw Convention's authors rejected use of
French franc as Convention's conversion unit).
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Finally, the Franklin Mint II court disapproved of the SDR because the
SDR constitutes a unit of conversion also subject to unilateral action by
an international body distinct from the parties to the Convention and
because the parties to the Convention never authorized use of the SDR.'
Since each proffered alternative was inappropriate, the Franklin Mint
I1 court declined to select a unit of conversion and instead suggested that
the political branches of the government enact legislation to provide a
unit of conversion. 8
Although the Franklin Mint II court declared Article 22 unenforceable
in cases involving loss of or damage to cargo, the Second Circuit did not
state what rules of liability would apply after the court's decision."9 Most
courts have held that the Warsaw Convention preempts state law rules
of liability to the extent that state law prevents application of the Con-
vention's liability limitations. ' Most courts have held, however, that if
the Convention's liability limitations do not apply, then the common law
rules of liability should again determine the proper damage award." At
common law, a carrier is liable for all damages to goods caused by the
carrier's negligence unless a statute or a contract limiting the liability
, See 690 F.2d at 310-11. The Franklin Mint II court offered three justifications for
not using the SDR to calculate TWA's liability. See id. First, the court stated that use of
the SDR would be inappropriate since the United States never has ratified the Montreal
Protocols. Id. Second, the court stated that use of the SDR would present practical prob-
lems since the court would have to set the liability limit by defining the limit in terms
of a particular number of SDRs per kilogram of cargo. See id. Finally, the court stated
that the SDR is the conversion unit of the IMF and, therefore, is subject to the IMF's
unilateral modification or elimination. Id. The court declared that it lacked authority to
adopt a unit of conversion subject to change by an international body distinct from the
Warsaw parties. See id. at 311.
" See id. (Franklin Mint II court stated that Article 22 is unenforceable until political
branch of government replaces gold with another unit of conversion).
" See id. at 311 n.27 (Second Circuit limited holding solely to unenforceability of Con-
vention's liability limitations).
70 See In Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th
Cir. 1982) (court held that Convention's liability limitation provisions preempt conflicting
California wrongful death statute); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir.) (Conven-
tion's liability limitation provisions govern all claims arising out of personal injury cases
involving passengers on international flights), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(plaintiffs cannot maintain separate wrongful death action under state law because Conven-
tion's liability limitations preempt conflicting state law), affjd on other grounds, 705 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1983).
1 See Maghsoudi v. Pan Am. World Airways, 470 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (D. Hawaii 1979)
(defendant who cannot take advantage of Article 22 may rely on common-law damage rule
to circumscribe defendant's liability); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702,
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court must use common-law rules of liability to determine defendant's
liability if Warsaw Convention does not apply to case); see also Zamora, Carrier Liability
For Damage or Loss to Cargo in Int'l Transport, 23 AM. J. CoMp. L. 391, 397 (1975) (com-
mon law provided that carrier was liable for all loss of or injury to goods that carrier con-
tracted to carry while goods were in course of transit).
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exonerates the carrier.7 2 If the Franklin Mint II court's decision to declare
the Convention's liability limitations unenforceable is correct, then the
Warsaw Convention provides for unlimited carrier liability.' Arguably
the only way a carrier can avoid full liability for cargo is to contract with
the owner of the cargo for a fixed level of liability. Article 23 of the Con-
vention (Article 23), however, prohibits a carrier from contracting for a
lower level of liability than the amount for which the Convention provides.
74
The effect of the Second Circuit's determination that Article 22 is unen-
forceable, therefore, is to subject carriers to full liability in all cases in:
volving damage to or loss of goods .
5
Although the Franklin Mint II court determined that the Conven-
tion's limits on liability for loss of cargo are unenforceable in the United
States, three federal district courts have adopted units of conversion and
have limited a carrier's liability in cargo cases without declaring Article
22 unenforceable. 7 Eighteen days after the district court decided Franklin
Mint L the District Court for the Southern District of Texas considered
the proper unit of conversion for Article 22 judgments in Boehringer Mann-
heim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.7 In Boehr-
inger, Pan American Airways (Pan Am) contracted to transport Boehr-
inger's 1860-pound automatic blood analyzer, which was damaged during
the course of delivery from Brazil to Texas.7 8 Boehringer sued Pan Am
r See Herd & Co. v. Krawell Mach. Co., 359 U.S. 297, 303 (1959) (discussion of liability
limitation provisions).
" See Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (effect of Franklin Mint II decision is that liability for damage to goods by air
carriers on international flights will be unlimited); Kreindler, The Future of the Warsaw
Convention, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (Franklin Mint II eliminated any effective
limitations on carriers' liability under Warsaw Convention); Moller, The Warsaw Conven-
tion: Can It Survive?, reprinted in 29 CONG. REC. S2276 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (damage
limitations in international air travel no longer exist after Franklin Mint I).
' See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 23; supra note 4 (Article 23).
71 See supra note 73 (carrier subject to unlimited liability in cargo cases after Franklin
Mint II).
7' See Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 23940 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (court determined that last official gold price was Convention's conversion unit);
Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
30, 1982) (court used last official price of gold to calculate carrier's liability under Article
22); Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344,
353 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (court used free market gold price to calculate carrier's liability under
Article 22), appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2,1982); see also Electronic Memories
& Magnetics Corp. v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Index No. 784512 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco, Aug. 25, 1982) (court calculated carrier's liability limit with reference to last
official gold price); cf. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535
F. Supp. 833, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (court used last official gold price to calculate carrier's
liability in personal injury case), ajffd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally
supra note 41 (dicta on Convention's unit of conversion).
531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981); appeal docketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1982).
7' Id. at 34647.
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for $75,000 and Pan Am relied on Article 22 to limit its liability. 9 Pan
Am claimed that the last official price of gold was the proper unit of con-
version, since the CAB has permitted airlines to calculate liability limita-
tions according to the last official gold price.' Boehringer argued, however,
that the free market gold price was the proper unit of conversion since
Congress had abolished the official gold price."
The Boehringer court noted the lack of judicial precedent regarding
the proper unit of conversion and looked to the history of the Warsaw
Convention to determine the appropriate unit.' The court considered two
CAB memoranda that discussed the effect of Congress' repeal of the official
gold price on the Convention's liability limitation.' A 1980 memorandum
suggested that abolition of the official gold price removed the legal basis
for using the official gold price to convert Convention judgments into
United States dollars.' A 1981 memorandum, however, stated that the
CAB should continue to engage in the legal fiction that an official gold
price exists to fulfill the United States' obligation to observe the re-
quirements of the Warsaw Convention." The Boehringer court dismissed
the memoranda as inconsistent with the history of the Convention, reason-
ing that the Convention's authors would not approve of the use of a fic-
titious gold price to convert Article 22 judgments into national currencies.'
Since the official gold price no longer existed, the Boehringer court declared
the free market price of gold the only proper basis for calculating Pan
Am's liability limitation."
' Id. at 348-49.
See id. at 352-53; supra note 51 (CAB rulings).
81 See 531 F. Supp. at 352-53.
See id. at 349-53 (court looked to Convention's history to determine proper unit of
conversion since no American court had previously considered issue); McGilchrist, supra
note 41, at 282 (Boehringer was case of first impression).
' See 531 F. Supp. at 351-52 (Boehringer court compared 1980 and 1981 CAB internal
memoranda).
I See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronautics Board, Memorandum on War-
waw Convention Liability Limits 4-5 (March 18, 1980) (memorandum recommended that CAB
use free market gold price as Convention's unit of conversion since official gold price did
not exist) [hereinafter cited as 1980 CAB memo].
I See 1981 CAB memo, supra note 51, at 5-6 (memorandum recommended that CAB
continue using last official gold price as Convention's unit of conversion because last of-
ficial gold price effectuates Convention's purpose to provide stable liability limitations).
" See 531 F. Supp. at 352 (Boehringer court determined that nothing in Warsaw Con-
vention's history supports position that courts should use last official gold price to calculate
carrier's liability limits).
' Id. at 353 & n.48 (Pan American was liable for $160,000). In Boehringer, Pan American's
(Pan Am) contract with Boehringer included a provision limiting Pan Am's liability to $9.07
per pound of goods. See id. at 353 ($9.07 per pound is last official gold price converted into
United States dollars). The Boehrirger court determined that Pan Am's liability limit under
Article 22 converted with reference to the free market price of gold at $400 an ounce was
approximately $1,160,000. See id. at 353 n.48 (Pan Am's liability limit was approximately
$86.00 per pound). The Boehringer court, therefore, rejected the contractual provision limiting
Pan Am's liability as a provision fixing a lower limit than the limit established in the Con-
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Although the Boehringer court claimed its holding effectuated the in-
tentions of the Convention's authors, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois rejected the Boehringer holding as inconsistent with
the Convention's history.' In Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengecell-
schaf,89 the plaintiff sought recovery from Deutsche Lufthansa Ak-
vention. Id. at 353; see supra text accompanying note 74 (Article 23 prohibits liability limits
below Article 22 ceiling).
I See Deere v. Deutcshe Lufthansa Aktiengecellschaft, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) (court determined that last official gold price was only conversion
unit that effectuated purpose of Warsaw Convention to limit carrier's liability at fixed and
definite sum); see also Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G., v. Northwest Airlines (Kern), 562 F.
Supp. 232,233 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In Kern, the plaintiff Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. (Kern) sought
damages from Northwest Airlines (Northwest) in the amount of $74,171 for injury to Kern's
duplicating machines during air shipment from the United States to Switzerland. Id. The
major issue in Kern was which conversion unit the court should use to calculate Northwest's
liability under Article 22. See id. (Northwest did not dispute nature and extent of damage
to Kern's machines). Northwest argued that the last official gold price was the Conven-
tion's proper unit of conversion. See id. at 237. Northwest, thus, maintained that its liability
could not exceed $45,850, the level of damages that would result should the court calculate
Northwest's liability with reference to the last official price of gold. Id. Kern, however,
claimed that the court should use the free market price of gold to calculate Northwest's
liability because an official gold price no longer existed. Id. Kern, therefore, asserted that
it could recover the full value of the machines since Northwest's liability limit calculated
with reference to the free market gold price exceeded Kern's damage claim of $74,171. Id.
After considering the conversion units proffered by the parties, the Kern court held
that the last official gold price was the proper conversion unit for limiting a carrier's liability
under Article 22. Id at 239. The court stated that the CAB had approved of the use of
the last official price of gold to convert Convention judgments by allowing carriers to con-
tinue to calculate liability limits with reference to the last official gold price. Id.; see supra
note 51 (CAB rulings). The Kern court reasoned that since the CAB was the governmental
agency most intimately concerned with limiting carriers' liability under the Warsaw Con-
vention, the court should enforce the CAB's position in favor of the last official gold price.
See Kern, 562 F. Supp. at 239. After acknowledging that both the Warsaw Crash and Franklin
Mint I courts had used the last official gold price to convert Convention judgments, the
Kern court maintained that the executive and the legislature should authorize application
of any conversion unit other than the last official gold price. Id Moreover, the court asserted
that since the CAB had allowed carriers' to calculate liability limits with reference to the
last official gold price, the public had notice that the courts might use the last official price
of gold to convert Convention judgments. Id. at 239-40. The court, thus, stated that main-
tanance of the CAB rule was not unjust because commercial entities like Kern could pro-
tect themselves from low liability limits by purchasing additional insurance. Id. at 240.
In determining that the last official price of gold was the Warsaw Convention's unit
of conversion, the Kern court explicitly rejected the Franklin Mint II court's holding that
Aritcle 22 is unenforceable. Id. at 239; see supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text (Franklin
Mint 11). The Kern court reasoned that it could not allow Kern to recover Kern's entire
damage claim since the clear intention of the Convention in Article 22 was to limit the
liability of air carriers on international runs. Kern, 562 F. Supp. at 239. Moreover, the Kern
court found that the Franklin Mint II court incorrectly determined that Congress' action
in repealing the official gold price operated to eliminate all limitations of liability in the
Convention. Id. Rather, the court stated that Congress did not intend to declare Article
22 unenforceable since the act authorizing the repeal of the official gold price primarily
dealt with various monetary matters and only incidently affected the provisions of the War-
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tiengecellschaft (Lufthansa) for damages to Deere's IBM computer that
occurred during Lufthansa's transport of the computer from Chicago to
Frankfurt, Germany.' The only issue in Deere was what unit of conver-
sion the court should use to limit Lufthansa's liability under Article 22.91
The parties in Deere offered the exchange value of the current French
franc, the last official price of gold, the free market price of gold, and
the SDR as alternate units of conversion.' Although the Deere court stated
that problems existed with the use of each alternative unit,3 the court
declared that it had to select one of the alternatives in order to enforce
Article 22."4 After noting that both the Boehringer and Franklin Mint II
courts disapproved of use of the last official gold price, the Deere court
determined that the last official gold price most nearly effectuated the
Convention's purpose to provide fixed and definite liability limitations. 5
The Deere court held, therefore, that the last official gold price was the
Convention's unit of conversion."
In rejecting the holdings in Boehringer and Franklin Mint II, the Deere
court relied on the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland (Warsaw
Crash).7 Warsaw Crash arose out of a fatal accident involving a jet owned
and operated by Polskie Linie Lotniczee (LOT) in which all the members
of an American boxing team died. One of the major issues in Warsaw
Crash was which unit of conversion the court should use to calculate LOT's
liability.9 Although Warsaw Crash was a personal injury case, the district
saw convention. Id.; see 22 U.S.C 286a note (Supp. II 1978) (Congress rescinded official gold
price); infra notes 158-67 (Franklin Mint II court lacked authority to declare Article 22
unenforceable).
Deere, No. 81 C 4726 slip op. at -.
See id., slip op. at 1.
See id., slip op. at 1-2.
See id., slip op. at 2.
See id., slip op. at 3 & 4 n.2 (Deere court agreed with Franklin Mint II court that
strong arguments against each alternative conversion unit existed).
Id., slip op. at 3.
9 d.
See id., slip op. at 3-4 (Deere court granted Lufthansa's motion for summary judg-
ment as to use of last official gold price for calculating Lufthansa's liability limit).
91 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal denied on issue of appropriate unit of conver-
sion, No. 82-8018 (2d Cir., Aug. 19, 1982), affid on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983);
see Deere No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3 (Deere court adopted Warsaw Crash court's determina-
tion that last official gold price was Convention's unit of conversion).
"' See 535 F. Supp. at 834.
" See id. at 839-44 (plaintiffs claimed that Article 23 nullified Montreal Agreement
because defendant's liability calculated with reference to free market gold price exceeded
$75,000); supra note 5 (Montreal Agreement); supra text accompanying note 74 (Article 23).
But see 535 F. Supp. at 843-44 (Warsaw Crash court determined that last official gold price
was proper unit of conversion and held that Montreal Agreement limited defendant's liability).
See generally In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1983).
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court did not distinguish personal injury cases from cargo cases when con-
sidering the Convention's unit of conversion. 1°0
The plaintiffs in Warsaw Crash, survivors of the American boxers,
claimed that the free market gold price is the proper unit of conversion
for limiting a carrier's liability under Article 22.01 LOT, however, con-
tended that the court should use either the French franc or the SDR to
calculate LOT's liability.'° After reviewing the arguments favoring the
alternative units proffered by the parties, the Warsaw Crash court re-
jected application of each conversion unit."' The court determined that
use of the free market value of gold as the Convention's unit of conver-
sion would contravene the Convention's purpose of providing consistent
liability limitations.' The court disapproved of the SDR and the French
franc as units of conversion because Article 22 still established liability
limitations with reference to gold."0 5 The Warsaw Crash court reasoned
that the court lacked authority to calculate Convention judgments with
reference to monetary units other than gold until the parties to the Con-
vention ratified an amendment eliminating gold as the Convention's unit
of conversion.'
Although neither party suggested use of the last official gold price,
the Warsaw Crash court limited LOT's liability with reference to the last
official gold price." The court stated that the Convention's authors in-
tended courts to limit Convention judgments with reference to a constant
11 See 535 F. Supp. at 839 (Warsaw Crash court adopted Franklin Mint I court's holding
that last official gold price is Convention's unit of conversion).
"lI See 535 F. Supp. at 839. The Warsaw Crash plaintiffs maintained that public policy
considerations mandated use of the free market gold price as the Convention's unit of con-
version. Id. First, the plaintiffs claimed that American attempts to raise the ceiling on the
Article 22 liability limitations indicated that the United States sought liability limits that
responded to inflation. Id.; see supra note 5 (American attempts to raise Article 22 liability
limits). The plaintiffs contended that use of the fluctuating free market gold price would
insure that the Article 22 liability limitations respond to inflation. 535 F. Supp. at 839.
Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the use of the free market price would effectuate the
United States' interest in establishing a liability limitation that provided maximum recovery
to plaintiffs. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that use of the free market price was proper
because the United States' deregulation of the airlines industry evidenced support for the
operation of free market forces in the industry. Id.
See 535 F. Supp. at 840-42 (LOT's arguments).
1 See id. at 841-43.
See id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843.
" See id. In Warsaw Crash, the court acknowledged that the drafting of treaties is
the sole province of the government's political branches. Id. The Warsaw Crash court declared
that until the parties to the Convention redrafted Article 22 to replace gold as the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion, the judiciary lacked authority to substitute an alternative method
of calculating a carrier's liability. Id. The court also declared that until the Warsaw parties
altered Article 22 to change the gold clause, the judiciary had to select a unit of conversion
that would enforce Article 22 without undermining the gold clause. See id.
107 Id.
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gold price maintained by the parties to the Convention."8 Use of the last
official gold price, therefore, was proper because the United States had
established the official gold price to determine the relationship of United
States' dollars and currencies of all other nations using a similar stan-
dard of conversion. 10 9 Moreover, the Warsaw Crash court determined that
application of the last official price to limit LOT's liability effectuated the
author's intentions to provide uniform liability limitations."' The Warsaw
Crash court, therefore, rejected the Boehringer holding and instead held
that the last official gold price remained the Warsaw Convention's unit
of conversion."'
In approving the Warsaw Crash court's use of the last official gold
price, the Deere court correctly determined that application of the last
official gold price as the Convention's unit of conversion produces results
more consistent with the Convention's purpose than does use of the free
market price."2 First, use of the last official price of gold as the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion effectuates the intentions of the Convention's
authors to provide uniform limitations of liability since the last official
gold price never changes."' Use of the free market price to convert Con-
108 Id.
109 Id.
"I See id. (Warsaw Crash court determined that use of last official gold price as conver-
sion unit provided more stable liability limitations than alternative conversion units).
... See id. at 843 & n.8 (Warsaw Crash court rejected Boehringer holding as inconsis-
tent with Convention's purpose to provide stable liability limitations and with CAB's approval
of last official gold price); supra text accompanying note 87 (Boehringer holding). In approv-
ing the Franklin Mint I court's holding that the last official gold price is the Convention's
unit of conversion, the Warsaw Crash court recognized that its holding might undermine
the intentions of the Convention's authors since an official gold price no longer existed.
See 535 F. Supp. at 844. The court, however, justified the holding on two grounds. Id. First,
the court stated that the international monetary system had not changed so much since
the abolition of the official gold price that use of the last official gold price to convert Con-
vention judgments would undermine the intentions of the Convention's authors. Id. Second,
the court stated that the parties to the Convention had indicated that the original Conven-
tion's liability limitations were not immutable by amending the Convention to raise the
liability limitations established by Article 22. Id.; see supra note 5 (amendments to Article
22). The Warsaw Crash court declared that the change in the gold standard probably demand-
ed another amendment by the parties. 535 F. Supp. at 844. Until the parties amended Arti-
cle 22, however, the court stated that the judiciary had to enforce Article 22 by utilizing
the last official price of gold to limit carriers' liability. Id.
12 See Deere, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3 (Deere court agreed with Warsaw Crash court's
determination that last official gold price is conversion unit that effectuates Convention's
purpose of limiting carrier's liability); see also Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest
Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239 (NJ). Ill. 1983) (court applied last official gold price to calculate
defendant's liability because clear intention of Warsaw Convention in Article 22 was to
limit liability of air carriers on international runs); supra notes 18-23 and accompanying
text (legislative history of Warsaw Convention indicates that purpose of Article 22 is to
establish carriers' liability at fixed and definite sum); supra notes 32-34 and accompanying
text (Warsaw parties rejected use of free market price as Convention's unit of conversion
at Montreal Conference).
11 See supra note 6 (last official gold price set at $42.22 an ounce).
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vention judgments does not provide uniform liability limits since the free
market price fluctuates daily."'. Second, application of the free market
price defeats the purpose of Article 22 because carriers' liability limita-
tions calculated with reference to the free market price usually are so
high that the liability limitations are ineffective.115 For example, in Boehr-
inger, the court calculated Pan Am's liability limit with reference to the
free market price of $400 an ounce."6 Pan Am's liability limit thus ap-
proximated $160,000, entitling Boehringer to recover its entire claim of
$75,000. "7 If the court had utilized the last official price of $42.22 an ounce,
however, Pan Am's liability would have amounted to $14,512. "8 The Boehr-
inger court's use of the free market price thus contravened the intentions
of the Warsaw authors to limit the carrier's liability at a fixed and definite
level."9
Proponents of the free market gold price argue, however, .that use
of the last official gold price leads to unreasonably low liability limita-
tions that usually prevent plaintiffs from recovering a reasonable amount
of damages from carriers.12 0 Since the free market price is the real value
"I See Gold Tumbles $100 in a Week, Wash. Post, March 1, 1983, at D7, col. 3 (free market
gold price fluctuated from $850 an ounce in 1980 to $400 an ounce in 1982); U.S. Pushes
Gold Sales, Wash. Post, April 13, 1983, at F1, col. 6 (price of gold was $431 an ounce on
April 12, 1983); see also G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL Am TRANSPORT 179 (1977)
(wide and uncontrolled variations in liability limitations resulting from use of free market
gold price frustrate Warsaw Convention's purpose); Asser, supra note 4, at 669 (use of free
market price to calculate defendant's liability inconsistent with intentions of authors of
Convention to establish uniform liability limits); Martin, supra note 8, at 75 (unstable free
market gold price inappropriate unit of conversion because it provides inconsistent liability
limitations).
" See McHenry, Aviation Law Report, 14 LAw Ais. 13, 16 (1982) (application of free
market gold price to calculate defendant's liability would remove Warsaw Convention's
liability limitations in majority of cases); see also Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest
Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court recognized that application of free
market gold price to convert Convention judgments would defeat Convention's purpose
in Article 22 of limiting carrier's liability); 535 F. Supp. at 841 n.6 (Warsaw Crash court
determined that use of free market gold price to calculate carriers' liability would destroy
liability limitations in cases involving injury to passengers); 531 F. Supp. at 353 n.97 (Boehr-
inger court recognized that use of free market gold price to calculate carriers' liability could
lead to unrealisticially high liability limitations).
" See 531 F. Supp. at 353 n.48 (defendant's liability limitation equaled approximately
$86.00 per pound if calculated with reference to free market gold price).
117 Id.
"I See id. at 353 (defendant's liability limitation equaled $9.07 per pound if calculated
with reference to official gold price).
"I See supra notes 5 & 18-23 and accompanying text (Convention's authors purposeful-
ly provided for low liability limitation).
"I See Heller, Converting the Gold Franc-a reply from the unconverted, 5 AIR L. 33,
33 (1980) (use of last official gold price to convert Convention judgments fails to provide
adequate compensation); Moller, Gold Up-Warsaw Damage Limitations Down, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
17, 1980, at 2, col. 1-3 (application of last official gold price to calculate carriers' liability
limits under Warsaw Convention does not afford plaintiffs fair compensation because last
official gold price does not reflect currency changes).
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of gold, the proponents claim that use of the free market price adequate-
ly compensates plaintiffs by providing recoverable damages that reflect
changes in inflation.12' Use of the free market price to calculate a carrier's
liability may effectuate the public policy of maximizing the recovery of
aggrieved plaintiffs. 2 ' Arguably, the ambiguous wording of Article 22
allows courts to utilize the free market gold price as the Convention's
unit of conversion on the basis of policy considerations alone." The War-
saw parties, however, explicitly rejected the free market price of gold
as the Convention's unit of conversion at the Montreal Conference because
the free market price would provide excessively high liability limits.124
Generally, courts hold that the actions of the parties to a treaty subse-
quent to the ratification of the treaty have some probative value in ascer-
taining the treaty's provisions."l Since application of the free market price
would produce results inconsistent with the intent of the Warsaw parties
to maintain carriers' liability limitations at a fixed and definite level, courts
should not use the free market price to avoid the Convention's low liability
limitations.
1" See R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 155
(1981) (courts should use free market gold price to convert Convention judgments because
free market price insures realistic liability limitations); Heller, supra note 6, at 95 (proper
unit of conversion for purposes of Article 22 is free market gold price since use of free
market price insures plaintiffs maximum recovery); Mendelsohn, The Value of the Poincarg
Gold Franc in Limitation of Liability Conventions, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 125, 127 (1973) (free
market price superior to official gold price as conversion unit because free market price
insures higher liability limitations); Moller, supra note 120, at 2, col. 2 (courts should apply
free market gold price to calculate Article 22 liability limitations); Tobolewski, supra note
5, at 179 (free market gold price proper unit for converting Convention judgments because
free market price reflects world inflation and commodity price increases); see also McGilchrist,
supra note 41, at 284 (Boehringer court influenced by near unanimity of commentators favoring
application of free market gold price to convert Convention judgments). But see J. GOLD,
SDRs, CURRENCIES AND GOLD 101 n.28 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 33, 1980) (use of free
market gold price as conversion unit indefensible because gold no longer serves as common
denominator for expressing value of currencies); supra note 114 (commentators who reject
use of free market gold price to convert Convention judgments); see also supra note 24
and accompanying text (purpose of Convention's gold clause).
'1 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 5, at 22-23 (1971) (basic premise of
American tort law is that injured parties should receive full compensation for injuries).
"I See GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 441 (1982) (some commentators favor
free market price as Convention's conversion unit simply because free market price com-
pensates for inadequate liability limitations); Gold Clauses, supra note 28, at 819 (courts
can use free market gold price as conversion unit to provide plaintiffs maximum recovery
as long as Article 22 refers to Poincar6 gold franc).
12 See Revised .Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at 790-91; supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text (Warsaw parties rejected free market price in favor of SDR as Conven-
tion's conversion unit).
" See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1967) (courts
may examine subsequent practices of parties as aid in treaty interpretation process), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Note, Maximizing Passenger Recovery Under the Warsaw Con-
vention: Articles 17 and 22, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 141, 144 n.17 (1977) (subsequent prac-
tice of individual parties is probative in treaty construction).
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Although the last official gold price is more representative of the War-
saw parties' intent than is the free market price of gold, the last official
gold price is not a perfect conversion unit because the last official price
lacks any relationship to contemporary currency values.'26 Application of
a fictitious gold price threatens to contravene the Warsaw authors' in-
tent to calculate Convention judgments with reference to a standard of
value that serves as an internationally approved conversion unit."' Most
courts recognize, however, that each alternative conversion unit has
drawbacks. '28 Courts that enforce Article 22, therefore, must select the
conversion unit that most nearly effectuates the intentions of the War-
saw parties." Since the last official gold price produces results consis-
tent with the Convention's purpose of limiting carrier's liability, use of
the last official gold price to convert Convention judgments is preferable
to use of the free market price of gold.'3 °
The Franklin Mint II court, nevertheless, rejected use of the last of-
ficial gold price as the Convention's unit of conversion, holding that Con-
gress' decision to repeal the official price of gold and subsequent failure
to replace gold with an alternative unit of conversion was an explicit re-
jection by Congress of the last official gold price as the Convention's unit
of conversion.'"' The Franklin Mint II court recognized, however, that
Congress may not have focused on the Warsaw Convention when repeal-
ing the official gold price."' The legislative history of Congress' repeal
11 See supra note 6 (Senate repealed official gold price because official price no longer
reflected true value of gold).
1" See Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengecellschaft, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3
& n.2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) (use of last official gold price to calculate carriers' liability
is easy to criticize because official gold price no longer exists); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Warsaw, Poland in March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (use of last
official gold price may contravene intent of Convention's authors to adopt conversion unit
that reflects changes in global economy), aiffd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983);
see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1982)
(problems with last official gold price as Convention's unit of conversion), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186). But see supra note 111 (Warsaw Crash court's
justifications for adopting last official gold price).
1I" See Deere, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3 & n.2 (conversion units proffered by parties
are easy to criticize); Warsaw Crash, 535 F. Supp. at 842-44 (court discussed arguments
against each alternative conversion unit); supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (Franklin
Mint II court's reasoning for rejecting alternative conversion units).
1I Deere, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3.
110 See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (application of last official gold price
as Convention's unit of conversion effectuates Convention's purpose of limiting carrier's
liability); supra text accompanying note 124 (Warsaw parties rejected use of free market
gold price).
"' See 690 F.2d at 311 (Congress abandoned unit of conversion specified by Warsaw
Convention); supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (Franklin Mint II court's reasoning).
11 See 690 F.2d at 311 (Franklin Mint II court recognized that Congress did not focus
explicitly on Warsaw Convention when Congress repealed Par Value Modification Act);
see also 72 U.S.C. S 286(a) (Supp. V 1981) (repealing Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-110, S 1, 87 Stat. 352,352 (1973); supra note 6 (discussion of Par Value Modification Act).
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of the official gold price actually indicates that Congress did not consider
the Convention when it abolished the official price of gold."n Courts
uniformly hold that a statute enacted subsequent to ratification of a trea-
ty does not repeal the treaty unless Congress explicitly intended to repeal
the treaty."u Since Congress did not explicitly focus on the Warsaw Con-
vention when repealing the official gold price, no basis exists for the
Second Circuit's holding that the repeal of the official gold price precludes
application of the last official price of gold as the Convention's conversion
unit."' The Franklin Mint II court, therefore, should have refrained from
declaring Article 22 unenforceable and instead should have held that the
last official gold price remains the Convention's proper unit of conversion.
In declaring Article 22 unenforceable, the Franklin Mint II court
limited the court's holding to cases involving loss of or damage to goods."w
The District Court for the Central District of California, however, extended
the Second Circuit's holding to a case involving death and injuries to
passengers."' The litigation in In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Air-
port, Korea (Kimpo3 8 arose from the crash of a Korean Air Lines (Korean)
jet near Seoul, Korea, killing several American passengers and injuring
others." The plaintiffs in Kimpo argued that the court should calculate
133 See supra notes 6 & 29 and accompanying text (Congress repealed official gold price
because of great disparity between official price of gold and free market price of gold);
see also Maschinenfabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239 (NJD. Ill.
1983) (court determined that Congress did not intend to declare Article 22 obsolete by
eliminating official price of gold). See generally FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., BRETTON WOODS
AGREEMENT ACT, S. REP. No. 1148, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (no reference to Warsaw
Convention included in Senate report accompanying abolition of official gold price), reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5935, 5935-67.
"' See e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1951) (subsequent and not incon-
sistent statute did not modify treaty); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1932) (statute
does not modify treaty unless Congress expressly intended statute to modify treaty); United
States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 71 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 1934) (later statute does not repeal
treaty unless Congress evidenced clear intent to repeal treaty).
.' See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. In rejecting application of the last
official gold price as the Convention's conversion unit, the Franklin Mint II court stated
that the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was a legislative declaration that Con-
gress no longer recognized the last official price of gold. Franklin Mint II, 690 F.2d at 309.
The legislative history of Congress' abolition of the official gold price, however, indicates
that Congress contemplated that gold would continue to play some economic role in the
international monetary system. See Bretton Woods Report, supra, note 133, at 5947 (Senate
recognized that vast numbers of legal mechanisms in international monetary system still
perpetutated some role for gold even though IMF intended to replace gold with SDR as
international unit of account); see also 31 U.S.C.A. 5117 (b) (West Supp. 1982) (United States
Treasury currently uses last official gold price to govern issuance of gold certificates).
13 See 690 F.2d at 311; McGilchrist, Can the U.S. courts denounce the Warsaw Conven-
tion?, 1983 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 111, 118 (Franklin Mint II holding applies only to
cargo claims although court's reasoning is equally applicable to bodily injury cases).
" See In Re Aircrash at Kimpo Intl Airport, Korea on November 18, 1980, 558 F.
Supp. 72, 74-75 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (Article 22 unenforceable in personal injury case).
"' Id.
13 Id. at 72.
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Korean's liability limitation with reference to the free market price of
gold. 4 ' Korean, on the other hand, offered the last official price of gold,
the SDR, and the current French franc as alternative units of conversion.4
The Kimpo court relied on the Franklin Mint II court's reasoning and
rejected application of the four alternative conversion units.' Since use
of each conversion unit was unacceptable, the Kimpo court held that Article
22 is unenforceable in cases involving death or injuries to passengers.'
In declaring Article 22 unenforceable, the Kimpo court recognized that
the holding subjected carriers to unlimited liability in personal injury cases
in American courts." A special arrangement entitled the Montreal Agree-
ment presently governs the liability limitations in cases involving injuries
to passengers on international flights that enter or leave the United
States.' The Montreal Agreement provides for absolute carrier liability
up to $75,000 for injuries to passengers on all international flights that
include the United States as a point of arrival, departure, or stopover.'46
The Montreal Agreement operates under a provision in Article 22 that
allows a passenger to contract with a carrier for a liability limitation that
exceeds the Article 22 limitation.47 If Article 22 is unenforceable, however,
Article 23 nullifies the Montreal Agreement because the Agreement would
reduce the liability of a carrier below the amount that a plaintiff could
recover under the Convention.'48 After Kimpo, therefore, plaintiffs may
"' Id.
.. Id. at 74.
"' See id. at 74-75 (Kimpo court agreed with Franklin Mint II court's determination
that alternate units of conversion proffered by parties are unacceptable).
" See id. In extending the Franklin Mint II holding to a case involving personal in-
jury, the Kimpo court recognized that the Franklin Mint I1 holding was prospective. Id.;
see supra note 56 (prospective application). The Kimpo court, however, applied the Franklin
Mint H decision retroactively and declared Article 22 unenforceable in an action that arose
prior to Franklin Mint II. See 558 F. Supp. at 75. The Kimpo court reasoned that the airlines
knew a rational limit on liability could not exist without an internationally agreed upon
unit of conversion. Id. Since the Montreal Conference in 1975 amounted to a recognition
by the Warsaw parties that the Convention's unit of conversion no longer existed, the court
stated that airlines could see as early as 1975 that courts might refuse to enforce Article
22. See id.; supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (Montreal Conference). But see supra
note 56 (Franklin Mint II court applied holding prospectively because Warsaw parties could
not have foreseen court's refusal to enforce Article 22).
'" See Kinpo, 558 F. Supp. at 75. (court determined Article 22 was unenforceable and
granted plaintiffs' motion to strike defense of Warsaw Convention).
" See supra note 5 (Montreal Agreement provides that airlines accept absolute liability
for injury to passengers up to $75,000 per passenger).
",' Id.
", See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22 (1) (Article 22 allows carriers to con-
tract for higher liability limit).
"' See id. art. 23 (Article 23 prohibits carrier from fixing liability limitation below level
that Warsaw Convention establishes); see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland
on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 839 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (use of free market gold price
to calculate carriers' liability negates application of Montreal Agreement since application
would constitute violation of Article 23), affjd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983);
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rely on state law to recover damages from airlines.149 In certain states,
provisions in wrongful death statutes may limit a carrier's liability."s State
conflict of law rules also may place plaintiffs in a jurisdiciton which limits
liability on wrongful death.151 Since most states, however, have no limita-
tions on liability for wrongful death, 2 carriers may be potentially liable
.for the full extent of damages suffered in personal injury cases." The
impact of the Kimpo and Franklin Mint 11 decisions is to subject carriers
to varying liability limits, including full liability, in cases involving both
damages to goods and to persons.54
Regardless of the legal basis of the Kimpo decision, the court's holding
McGilchrist, supra note 136 at 118 (conclusion that Montreal Agreement would become a
nullity if Franklin Mint II applied to personal injury cases).
"' See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (state
law determines defendant's liability if Article 22 does not apply).
,so See SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2D 7.1, 7.2 (1975 & Supp. 1982)
(wrongful death statutes in Maine and West Virginia impose liability limitations); see also
Note, A Proposed Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 57 IND. L.J. 297, 306 n.62 (1982) (list
of twenty-six states that create original cause of action in wrongful death statutes) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Revision].
11 See SPEISER, supra note 150, at 13.2 (conflict of law rules in certain jurisdictions
would require courts to apply excessively low liability limitations of such countries as Brazil
and Mexico if damage claims arose out of accidents in those countries); see also Tramotana
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandese, 350 F.2d 468, 470-77 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (court
applied Brazilian law and limited plaintiffs recovery to $170 for death of American in plane
crash in Brazil); Prott v. Royder, 517 S.W.2d 922, 923-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (court ap-
plied Mexican law to measure damages in claims arising out of plane crash in Mexico because
Texas courts apply law of place of accident). But see In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp.
732, 739-47 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (court refused to apply foreign standards and instead applied
California law to measure claimant's recovery since California's interests in resolving suit
were significantly greater than interests of countries of states of which decedents or claimants
were citizens, Kreindler, Pan Am Crash Spotlights Airline Putsch on Montreal, N.Y.L.J.,
July 18, 1982, at 4, col. 5 (New York, California, Florida, and Illinois have replaced tradi-
tional conflicts rule under which courts rigidly apply law of place of accident with flexible
method whereby courts consider question of which law has most significant relationship
with particular transaction). See generally MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6 (rules of
jurisdiction and standards of liability are completely unpredictable if Convention's liability
limitations do not apply).
"5 See SPEISER, supra note 150, at 72.
"1 See Maghsoudi v. Pan Am. World Airways, 470 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (D. Hawaii 1979)
(common-law damage rules determine defendant's liability if Article 22 does not apply); see
also In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia On April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982)
(court held that California's wrongful death law would determine defendant's liability if
Article 22 did not apply).
" See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (Kimpo holding may subject air car-
riers to full liability in personal injury cases); supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text
(Franklin Mint II holding subjects carriers to unlimited liability in property damage cases);
see also 29 CONG. REC. S2250 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (Kimpo
and Franklin Mint II effectively eliminate Warsaw Convention by subjecting carriers to
unlimited liability); Kreindler, Montreal Protocols Ready For Vote, N.Y.L.J., March 7, 1983




that Article 22 is unenforceable in personal injury cases could elicit strong
negative responses from the other Warsaw parties.155 Since the majority
of foreign airlines are state-owned, most Warsaw parties are strongly
opposed to the idea of unlimited carrier liability.15 Consequently, several
foreign governments have informed the State Department that the
Franklin Mint II decision will seriously affect the United States relations
in international aviation." The Kimpo and Franklin Mint II holdings,
therefore, create the possibility that other parties to the Convention may
eliminate Warsaw coverage for American carriers.
The Kimpo decision will be void, however, if the Supreme Court deter-
mines that the Franklin Mint II court lacked authority to declare Article
22 unenforceable.' The Supreme Court consistently has held that courts
may annul or disregard provisions of a treaty that the Senate has ratified
only if the provisions are unconstitutional." In declining to enforce Arti-
cle 22, the Franklin Mint II court did not question the constitutionality
of the Warsaw Convention.6 ' The Franklin Mint II court instead
"l Cf. Asser, supra note 4, at 645 (most foreign countries will accuse United States
of violating Warsaw Convention if American courts calculate carriers' liability limits with
reference to free market gold price); Gaynes Memo, supra notes 33, at 4 (United States
adoption of free market gold price as Convention's unit of conversion might lead to wholesale
denunciation of Convention).
1w See 29 CONG. REC. S2271 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Danforth)
(foreign countries strongly oppose high liability standards advocated by United States and
reject concept of unlimited carrier liability); see also Warsaw Revision, supra note 150, at
312 n.100 (most foreign carriers engaged in international transport are owned by foreign
governments).
157 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie at 2-3, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans
World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S.
January 15, 1983) (No. 82-1186) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curie Brief].
1. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (Supreme Court granted TWA's and Franklin
Mint's writs of certiorari).
159 See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1854) (courts must enforce provisions
of treaties unless provisions are unconstitutional); see also Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270,
288 (1902) (courts ought to enforce treaties); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 US. 190, 194-95
(1888) (courts have duty to enforce treaties and should not abrogate provisions of treaty
unless provisions are unconstitutional).
11' See 690 F.2d at 311 n.27 (Franklin Mint II holding limited solely to prospective unen-
forceability of Article 22 in cargo cases). The majority of courts considering the constitu-
tionality of the Warsaw Convention have held that the Convention's liability limitation clause
is constitutional. See Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 486, 487 (D.N.J. 1957) (court
rejected plaintiff's attack on constitutionality of Convention); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
Am. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw Convention is con-
stitutional). But ef. Inre Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia On April 22,1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308-13
(9th Cir. 1982). In Bali, the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of Article 22, arguing
that the liability limitation burdened the plaintiffs' right to travel. Id. at 1309; see Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1965) (international travel is fundamental constitutional right).
The Bali court held that the plaintiffs had a right to compensation from the United States
government if the $75,000 liability limitation established by the Montreal Agreement
unreasonably impaired the plaintiffs' claims for damages. See Bali, 684 F.2d at 1311-12 (plaintiff
can recover damages from United States government if liability limitation constitutes tak-
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distinguished unenforceability from termination, noting that courts can-
not end treaty obligations by judicial decree.' The Franklin Mint II
holding, however, substantially alters carriers' obligations under the War-
saw Convention by subjecting carriers to full liability in cases involving
both goods and persons."2 Generally, courts hold that any change in an
essential provision of a treaty constitutes a modification of the treaty."
Most courts addressing the question have held that a court does not have
the authority to modify an essential provision of a treaty absent a clear
declaration by either the President or Congress authorizing the
modification."' In Franklin Mint II, the court did not have such a declara-
tion since neither the President nor Congress has endorsed abolition of
the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation.' 5 The Second Circuit,
ing of property without compensation). The Bali court, however, declined to determine
whether the Warsaw Convention was unconstitutional and instead stated that whether Ar-
ticle 22 amounted to an unreasonable taking of plaintiff's property was a question for the
Court of Claims. See id. at 1311-12; see also Moller, supra note 73, at S2276 (Bali and Franklin
Mint II decisions portend overdue demise of Warsaw Convention). See generally Haskill,
The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 483 (1973)
(discussion of constitutionality of Warsaw Convention).
"61 See 690 F.2d at 311 & n.26 (Franklin Mint II court stated that courts cannot ter-
minate treaties that Senate has ratified).
6 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (owner of damaged or lost goods can
recover full value of goods after Franklin Mint I); McGilchrist, supra note 136, at 116
(Franklin Mint H court's holding of Article 22 unenforceable effectively abrogated Warsaw
Convention).
I" See In re Air Crash Disaster in Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp.
833, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (annulment or disregard of essential provision of treaty constitutes
modification of treaty that only Senate can make), affid on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1983).
16 See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n.,
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (Court reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights
absent explicit statutory language, Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S.
404, 412-13 (1968) (Congress must express clear intent to abrogate treaty before Court will
hold that Congress abrogated treaty); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles
W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (courts should not impute to Congress intention to
abrogate or modify treaty).
16I See supra note 35 and accompanying text (political branches of government favor
maintaining Warsaw Convention's liability limitation regime); see also Amicus Curie Brief,
supra note 157, at 9-16 (Justice Department's brief on behalf of TWA states that Franklin
Mint II court did not have requisite Congressional authorization to declare Article 22 unen-
forceable); ef. supra note 51 and accompanying text (CAB continues to allow carriers to
calculate liability limitations with reference to last official gold price). The CAB's approval
of carriers' tariffs calculated with reference to the last official gold price supports the viability
of the last official gold price as a conversion unit. See Maschinenfabrick Kern, A.G. v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court enforced CAB's position
favoring last official gold price because CAB is governmental agency most intimately con-
cerned with air carriers' liability limits); Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengellschaft,
No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) (court relied on CAB approval of last
official gold price as support for court's holding). Generally, courts follow the interpreta-
tion of treaty provisions by the government agencies charged with enforcing the treaties.
See Sumitomo Shoji Am. Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (agency's interpreta-
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therefore, effectively rewrote Article 22 by subjecting carriers to unlimited
liability without clear authorization from the political branches' of
government.16 Since treaty drafting is the exclusive province of the
political branches, the Franklin Mint IT court lacked authority for its
holding.
167
In declaring Article 22 unenforceable, the Franklin Mint II court
recognized that most foreign courts have enforced Article 22.168 The
foreign courts, however, like American courts have adopted inconsis-
tent units of conversion. 69 The civil court of Rome, for example, has
determined that the SDR is the proper standard for converting Article
22 judgments into the Italian lire .17  Another Italian court used the
free market gold price to calculate a carrier's liability. 7' Courts in
tion of treaty provision entitled to great weight); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961) (courts should grant agency's interpretation of treaty provision probative value when
interpreting treaty); cf. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,594 n.30 (1981) (reviewing
court not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of agency).
"I See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (limitations on airline liability are fact
of life in international aviation law); supra note 38 and accompanying text (United States
does not plan to abrogate Convention); supra text accompanying note 75 (Franklin Mint
II court eliminated liability limitations provided by Warsaw Convention); see also supra
note 19 and accompanying text (Article 22 most important Convention provision).
167 See supra notes 155 & 160 (judiciary's role in conduct of foreign affairs limited to
enforcement of treaties); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939) (most issues
in United States foreign relations are beyond competence of judiciary to examine). The
Supreme Court has held that courts cannot terminate treaties because treaties are inter-
national obligations entered into by the political branches of the government. Id.; see Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (treaty termination is responsibility of political bran-
ches of government). Courts, therefore, generally refuse to inquire into the validity of treaties.
See generally Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements By The United
States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879 (1958).
' See Franklin Mint IT, 390 F.2d at 608-09.
,G See id. See generally GOLD, supra note 123, at 439-57 (discussion of judicial applica-
tion of gold units of account in international treaties that contain liability limitation provi-
sions); McGilchrist, supra note 48, at 166-69 (discussion of foreign courts that have adopted
alternate units of conversion for limiting carriers' liability).
"7 See Linee Aerea Italiene v. Riccioli, Judgment of Nov. 14, 1978, Corte cass. Italy,
1978 Foro It. I -, reprinted in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), app. 95-108 (hereinafter cited as Appendix). The sole issue in Riccioli
was the defendant's liability limitation under Article 22. Id. at 101. After noting that alter-
native units of conversion exist for converting Convention judgments into Italian lira, the
Riccioli court stated that the Warsaw authors' adoption of a gold franc as the Convention's
conversion unit indicated that the authors intended to calculate damages through the ex-
change systems. Id. at 105. The court then determined that the SDR was closer to the
value of the Poincar6 franc and the official exchange rate of the Italian lire than any other
alternative conversion unit. Id. at 106. The Riccioli court, therefore, held that the SDR
was'the conversion unit most consistent with the intentions of the Warsaw authors and
used the SDR to calculate the liability of the defendant airlines. Id.
170 Cosida S.p.A. v. British Airways European Division, Judgment of June 9, 1981, Corte
app., Italy, 1981 For. It. I -, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 31-41. In Cosida,
the plaintiff sought recovery from British Airways European Division (B.E.A.) for the full
value of a parcel containing gold objects which B.E.A. allegedly lost during the course of
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both India 7' and Greece'73 also held that the free market gold price
is the proper unit of conversion for determining liability limitations under
Article 22.' In France, however, two courts have adopted the modern
French franc as the Convention's conversion unit.' A lack of uniformity
in Convention judgments, therefore, exists in foreign courts as well as
in American courts."6 The inability of courts to adopt a standard unit
transport. Id. at 33. After determining that Article 22 limited B.E.A.'s liability, the Cosida
court looked to the language of the Convention to determine the proper conversion unit.
See id. at 40. The court stated that Article 22 required calculation of a carrier's liability
according to the value by which francs are substituted on the date of decision. Id. Since
a gold free market existed in Italy on the date of the decision, the court refered to the
average quotation of the two principal European markets at London and Zurich to deter-
mine a free market gold price for calculating B.E.A.'s liability. See id. (court calculated B.E.A.'s
liability with reference to conversion unit amounting to approximately $500 per troy ounce).
17 See Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Sanghi, Judgment of August 11, 1978, -, Civil Sta-
tion Bangalore, India, 1978 - , - , reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 265-71.
In Kuwait, the defendant airlines lost plaintiffs luggage on a flight from India to London.
Id. at 267. At trial, the defendant invoked Article 22 and claimed that the proper unit for
calculating the defendant's liability limit was the official price of gold. Id. at 267-68. The
court rejected the defendant's claim and held the free market gold price was the proper
unit of conversion since the Indian Carriage by Air Act of 1972 provided that Article 22
calculations should be converted into rupees at the prevailing rate of exchange. Id. at 269.
17 See Zakoapolos v. Olympic Airways Corp., Judgment of February 15, 1974, Ct. of
App. 3d Dep't, Athens, 1974 - - (free market gold price is proper unit of conversion
for purposes of Article 22), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 251-55. In Zakoapolos,
the Athens Court of Appeals relied on the language of the Hague Protocol to determine
that the free market gold price should be the Convention's unit of conversion. Id. at 252-53;
see supra note 5 (Hague Protocol). Article 22 of the Hague Protocol provides that a court
should convert damages into national currencies according to the currencies' gold values
at the date of judgment. See Hague Protocol, supra note 5, art. 22. The Zakoapolos court
reasoned that the Protocol's authors intended courts to use the free market price of gold
since the official price of gold would not differ from one date to another. See Appendix,
supra note 170, at 252-53.
17. See GoLD, supra note 123, at 440-41 & nn.5-9 (foreign courts occasionally used market
price of gold to convert Convention judgments prior to effective date of Jamaica Accords);
see also Bulkan Bulgarian Airlines v. Tammaro, Judgment of Oct. 25, 1976, Corte app. Italy,
1976 Foro It. I - (court calculated defendant's liability limitation with reference to quotation
of gold on principal European markets at London and Zurich), reprinted in Appendix, supra
note 170, at 263, 263-64; Forencia C.I.A. Argentina De Seguros S.A. v. Varig S.A., Judg-
ment of August 27, 1976, National Court of Appeals, Buenos Aires, 1976 Jurisprudencia
Argentina [J.A.] - (court used free market gold price to convert Convention judgment),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 256, 257-60.
1I See Pakistan Int'l Airlines v. Compagnie Air Inter S.A., Judgment of October 31,
1981, Cours d'appel, Aix-en-Provence, 1981 Dalloz-Sirey Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] - (court
calculated carrier's liability with reference to value of current French franc because Jamaica
Accords prohibit IMF members from maintaining external value of currency in terms of
gold), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 156-70; Chamie v. Egyptair, Judgment of
Jan. 31, 1980, Cours d'appel, Paris, 1980 D.S. Jur - (court rejected application of both
last official gold price and free market gold price and used current French franc as conver-
sion unit because French franc has gold weight identical to Poincar6 franc), reprinted in
Appendix, supra note 170, at 171-92.
17 Compare supra note 16 and accompanying text (American courts have selected in-
consistent units to convert Convention judgments) with supra notes 170-75 (foreign courts
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of conversion undermines the intentions of the authors of the Warsaw
Convention to provide uniform liability limitations.177
Since foreign and United States courts have failed to adopt a stan-
dard unit of conversion, a carrier's liability under Article 22 varies depend-
ing on where a plaintiff brings an action against the carrier.'78 Article 28
of the Convention provides that a plaintiff has the option of bringing suit
in the court of the domicile of the carrier, or in the carrier's principal
place of business, or in the country where the plaintiff contracted for car-
riage or at the place of destination. 179 A plaintiff alleging damages under
the Warsaw Convention presumably will bring suit against a carrier in
the court that uses the unit of conversion providing the highest liability
limitation.8 In the majority of cases, therefore, plaintiffs will bring suit
in courts that use the free market price of gold as the unit of conversion
since the value of the free market price is so much higher than the value
of other units of conversion.' Alternatively, plaintiffs will bring suit in
American courts that follow the Franklin Mint 1I and Kimpo decisions
since plaintiffs usually will recover damages that exceed the Article 22
liability limitation."2 The inability of the courts to adopt a standard unit
have selected inconsistent units to convert Convention judgments).
11 See supra notes 3 & 18-23 and accompanying text (Warsaw authors intended to create
uniform levels of carriers' liability).
I" See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (foreign courts adopt inconsistent
units of conversion); see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28 (forum provision);
Since courts adopt inconsistent units of conversion, plaintiffs in actions arising under the
convention may be able to use Article 28(1) to secure high damage awards. For example,
suppose a carrier operated by Air France departs from Paris to Montreal. En route to
Montreal, the carrier stops in London and picks up passengers. After leaving London, the
plane crashes outside of Montreal and all the passengers die. The majority of the passengers'
relatives, therefore, probably would bring suit in Montreal, the place of destination, because
Canadian courts utilize the free market price of gold to convert Convention judgments.
See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland, on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 839
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), affid on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983). Passengers that bought
tickets in London could bring suit in English courts where the unit of conversion is the
SDR. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 308 n.14 (2d Cir. 1982)
(British Carriage by Air order requires courts to use SDR to convert Convention judgments),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No. 82-1186). Presumably, very few
passengers would bring suit in France because the French courts utilize the current French
franc as the unit of conversion and the value of the French franc is far less than the value
of the free market price of gold or the SDR. See supra note 175 and accompanying text'
(French courts convert Convention judgments with reference to current French franc).
" See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
1 Id.; see supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (foreign courts have adopted in-
consistent units of conversion).
.. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (free market gold price has exceeded $850
an ounce).
16 Interview with Sir Joseph Gold, Senior Consultant of the Legal Department of the
International Monetary Fund, in Lexington, Virginia (April 8, 1983) (Franklin Mint II deci-
sion will lead to overcrowding in American courts as foreign plaintiffs will try to take ad-
vantage of unlimited liability) [hereinafter cited as Gold interview]; supra text accompany-
ing note 154 (Kimpo and Franklin Mint H decisions subject carriers to unlimited liability
in cargo and passenger cases).
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of conversion, therefore, increases the possibility of widespread forum
shopping."
Although the Warsaw Convention continues to provide a degree of
uniformity to international air travel," the parties to the Convention must
adopt a standard unit for converting Convention judgments to eliminate
forum shopping and provide uniform liability limitatons. 115 The demise of
the gold standard as an internationally approved unit of conversion has
undermined the efforts of the Convention's authors to establish a uniform
system of liability."' The parties to the Warsaw Convention, therefore,
must amend Article 22 and replace gold with another unit of conversion
that is more responsive to the current international order.87 Arguably,
the Montreal Protocols are an appropriate amendment because the Pro-
tocols substitute the SDR for gold as the Convention's unit of conversion. 1
Without the approval of the United States, however, there is little chance
that the Warsaw parties will ratify the Protocols." The lack of uniform-
ity that currently characterizes Convention judgments will continue unless
" See Warsaw Revision, supra note 150, at 307 (forum shopping contravenes Conven-
tion's purpose of uniformity).
"' See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (Warsaw Convention provides uniform
system of rules and procedures for protection of travellers and shippers); see also In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3,1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 741-42 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The Paris Crash
case demonstrates the problems that will arise if courts hold Article 22 unenforceable and
rely on state law rules to determine damage awards. See id.; see also supra notes 71-73
and accompanying text (common-law rules of liability apply in cargo cases after Franklin
Mint I/; supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (state wrongful death statues deter-
mine damage awards in cases involving death after Kimpo). Paris Crash arose out of a
fatal accident involving an American-built plane owned by Turkish Air Lines shortly after
takeoff in France. See Paris Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 735. The 337 decedents in Paris Crash
were from 24 countries. Id. at 741-42. The claimants were from 12 states. Id. After Kimpo
and Franklin Mint II, a court would have to determine choice of law questions and recoverable
damages under each set of state law. Applying the various state rules could thus lead to
virtually endless litigation in personal injury cases arising under the Convention. Enforce-
ment of Article 22, however, would prevent the lengthy litigation that is inevitable if courts
must determine each case on the basis of state law liability rules. See MONTREAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 6 (Warsaw Convention insures reliable recovery to plaintiffs with less litiga-
tion and related expenses than if Convention did not exist).
18 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (inconsistent liability limits lead to
forum shopping); supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (foreign courts have adopted
inconsistent units of conversion); supra note 16 and accompanying text (American courts
have adopted inconsistent units to convert Convention judgments).
1 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (demise of gold standard); supra notes 2-3
and accomanying text (purpose of Convention).
18 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (Warsaw parties determined gold was
inappropriate unit of conversion).
I" See MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee
strongly supported Montreal Protocols); supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (Mon-
treal Protocols).
" Gold interview, supra note 182; see MONTREAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (Warsaw
parties probably will not ratify Protocols if Senate rejects Protocols); supra note 35 (United
States played important role in drafting of Montreal Protocols).
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the Warsaw parties take action to insure uniform application of the Con-
vention's liability limitations.9 '
Absent international action, Congress may take steps to insure uniform
application of Article 22 in American courts by selecting an appropriate
unit of conversion. 9' Some countries have precluded national courts from
selecting inconsistent units of conversion to enforce Article 22 by enact-
ing official regulations specifying the montary units that courts should
use to convert Convention judgments."' For example, English courts
achieved consistent application of Article 22 after the government pro-
mulgated the Carriage by Air Order of 1980 and allowed courts to utilize
SDRs for purposes of the Warsaw Convention.'93 By enacting legislation
that provides a substitute for gold as the Convention's unit of conversion,
Congress would eliminate the inconsistent judgments that currently arise
under Article 22 and forestall widespread denunciation of the Convention
by countries whose airlines are subject to unlimited liability in American
courts.'94
In selecting a conversion unit for American courts, Congress should
attempt to promote international uniformity by adopting an internationally
recognized unit of conversion.'95 Since most countries no longer approve
of gold as a conversion unit,' 9 the SDR is the most logical unit for conver-
9 See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (foreign courts have adopted incon-
sistent units of conversion); supra note 16 and accompanying text (American courts have
adopted inconsistent units to convert Convention judgments).
... See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 15, 1980, 535 F. Supp.
833, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Congress must enact legislation to resolve uncertainty in American
courts concerning Convention's unit of conversion), affd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1983).
"' See S. Silard, A Comment on Franklin Mint v. TWA (Dec. 7, 1982) (unpublished
manuscript) (West Germany, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, and Great Britain have adopted
SDRs as basis for converting Convention judgments into national currencies); Gold inter-
view, supra note 182 (Netherlands recently adopted SDR as basis for calculating carrier's
liability limitations).
' See British Carriage By Air (sterling equivalents) Order of 1980, Statutory Instru-
ment 1980 No. 281 (Parliament adopted SDR for purposed of Article 22). The Carriage By
Air Order allows the British government to fix the sterling equivalent to the Warsaw Con-
vention's unit of conversion. Id.; see McGilchrist, supra note 48, at 164 (Carriage By Air
Order insures that Convention's liability limitations are uniform). In 1978, the British govern-
ment amended the Carriage By Air order to effect conversions on the basis of the current
market value in sterling of the SDR. Id. British courts, therefore, have experienced no dif-
ficulty converting the Convention's liability limitations into pounds. Id.
'' See J. GOLD, supra note 121, at 92 (enactment of official regulations translating Poincar6
gold francs into SDR eliminates problem of inconsistent application of gold clauses); supra
note 16 (American courts have adopted inconsistent units of conversion).
,' See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (Warsaw parties must adopt stan-
dard unit of conversion since uniformity in international aviation law is purpose of Conven-
tion); supra note 24 and accompanying text (Warsaw authors selected gold as Convention's
conversion unit because gold was internationally approved conversion unit that provided
consistent liability limitations).
196 See GOLD, supra note 123, at 455-46 (most countries do not recognize gold as accep-
table unit of conversion).
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ting Convention judgments." First, the SDR currently serves the same
monetary function that gold served when gold had an official price.'98 Con-
sequently, parties to at least thirty other international transportation con-
ventions have replaced gold with the SDR as the conventions' unit of
conversion."' Second, the Warsaw parties determined that the SDR is
the logical replacement for gold at the conference that promulgated the
Montreal Protocols." ° Although the Senate rejected ratification of the Pro-
tocols, the legislative history of the rejection indicates approval of the
use of the SDR as a conversion unit.2 °0 Third, the SDR is not subject to
unilateral devaluation like a national currency because the IMF's Articles
of Agreement require 85 percent of the organizaton's 146 members to
approve a major change in the SDR's valuation."2 Finally, the SDR is a
relatively stable unit because the SDR does not have a commodity price."
Use of the SDR as the Convention's conversion unit, therefore, provides
the stable liability limitations sought by the Warsaw parties."4 Since the
SDR is the logical substitute for gold as the Convention's unit of conver-
sion, Congress should follow England's lead and enact legislation requir-
ing courts to convert Convention judgments with reference to the SDR.2 °5
Until Congress determines the proper unit of conversion, however,
the American courts must enforce Article 22 by selecting one of the alter-
native units."6 Although no court has used the SDR to calculate a car-
"' See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (court determined that SDR is logical unit of conversion because SDR has replaced
gold as international unit of conversion), aff'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (82-1186).
,98 See supra note 13 (IMF replaced gold with SDR as international unit of conversion
in Jamaica Accords).
,'9 Gold interview, supra note 182; see GOLD, FLOATING CURRENCIES SDRS, AND GOLD
37-38 (IMF Pamphlett series No. 22, 1978) (international organizations and conventions that
have replaced gold with SDR as unit of conversion).
See supra notes 32-34 (Montreal Conference).
20 See 29 CONG. REC. 82239 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Percy) (SDR
is stable unit of conversion that provides more consistent measurements than gold or any
particular currency); see also Letter from Elizabeth H. Dole, Secretary of Transportation,
to Howard Baker (March 7, 1983) (Reagan Administration approves of use of SDR as con-
version unit for limiting liability under Warsaw Convention), reprinted in 29 CONG. REC.
82278 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
22 See Articles, supra note 13, art. 15, § 2.
s See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1982)
(SDR is relatively stable since SDR fluctuations are generally less extreme than fluctua-
tions in free market gold price), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 14, 1983) (No.
82-1186).
24 See supra text accompanying note 17 (Convention's authors drafted Article 22 to
insure uniform limitations of carriers' liability).
25 See supra note 193 and accompanying text (British Carriage by Air Act); supra note
192 (foreign countries that have adopted SDRs for purpose of converting Convention
judgments); see also J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS XVIII 648 (1982) (IMF
countries currently are substituting SDRs for gold as conversion units for international
conventions which formerly used Poincar6 franc to convert convention judgments).
I See Deere v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, No. 81 C 4726, slip op. at 3
[Vol. 40:1463
AIR CARRIERS' LIABILITY
rier's liability, a strong argument exists that American courts may use
SDRs to convert Convention judgments."7 Generally, courts try to inter-
pret the Warsaw Convention in view of its modern purposes, rather than
acceding to the goals of the era when the Convention was promulgated."8
Since the SDR currently serves the same function as an international unit
of conversion that gold served in 1929, use of the SDR as the Conven-
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1982) (American courts must enforce Article 22 since United States re-
mains party to Warsaw Convention); supra note 9 (role of judiciary in foreign affairs is
to enforce treaties).
' See GOLD, supra note 121, at 91 (rational choice for courts applying Warsaw Con-
vention's gold clause is to use SDR to convert Convention judgments). Several foreign courts
have used the SDR to calculate carriers' liability in cases arising under international transport
conventions that use Poincar6 gold francs as the conventions' unit of conversion. See, e.g.,
Matter of the Khendrick Kuivas, Judgment of Dec. 29,1976, Hamburg District Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, 1976 - 6; Linee Aerea Italiene v. Riccioli, Judgment of Nov. 14,
1978, Corte Cass., Italy Foro It. I - , reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 95-108;
State of the Netherlands v. Giant Shipping Corp., Judgment of May 1, 1981, Supreme Court
Neth., 1981, N.J. -, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 170, at 64-95. In the Khendrik
Kuivas case, for example, the Hamburg District Court adoptd the SDR for calculating the
liability of a Soviet vessel in a case arising under the International Convention Relating
to the Limitation of the Liability of Ounces of Seagoing Ships (Ship Convention). Id. The
liability limitation clause in the Ship Convention, like Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention,
refers to the Poincar6 gold franc as the Ship Convention's unit of conversion. Id. at 4. The
Khendrick Kuivas court reasoned that the application of the SDR was the most practical
procedure for achieving uniformity in international limits of liability because the IMF was
in the process of substituting SDRs for gold as the international unit of account. Id. at 6.
More recently, in the Giant Shipping case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands adopted
the SDR as the unit of conversion for an analogous liability limitation provision under the
International Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea. See Appendix, supra note 170, at
87 (court rejected applicaton of free market price to calculate carrier's liability under con-
vention that referred to Poincar6 gold franc as unit of conversion). The Giant Shipping
court offered two justifications for its holding that the SDR was the proper unit of conver-
sion for Convention judgments. Id. First, the IMF had adopted the SDR as the successor
to gold as the internationally approved unit of conversion. Id. Second, legislatures in many
countries were preparing amendments to international transportation conventions that would
replace gold with the SDR as the conventions' unit of conversion. Id. The Netherlands
legislature subsequently approved the Giant Shipping decision by adopting SDRs as the
basis for converting Convention judgments into guilders. Gold interview, supra note 153.
Since Giant Shipping is the only decision concerning conversion units rendered by the highest
court of a Warsaw Convention party, American courts should afford the Giant Shipping
holding some probative value when enforcing Article 22. See Pigeon River Improvement,
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 158-63 (1934) (Supreme Court relied
on interpretation of multilateral treaty by Canadian Supreme Court); supra notes 17 &
185-90 and accompanying text (one major goal of Warsaw Convention is uniform application
of Article 22).
"' See Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975) (judiciary may con-
strue Convention's provisions liberally to insure that change in circumstance from date
of treaty's drafting does not destroy purpose of treaty), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976);
see also Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1261 n.10 (9th Cir.
1977) (court may consider change in circumstances since 1929 treaty enactment when con-
struing provisions of Warsaw Convention); ef. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929)
(courts should construe treaties liberally to effectuate intentions of treaties' parties).
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tion's conversion unit would provide a contemporary interpretation of Ar-
ticle 22.19 Moreover, since application of SDRs as the Convention's unit
of conversion would produce stable limitations of liability, use of the SDR
to convert Convention judgments is more consistent with the Convention's
purpose of limiting carriers' liability than is holding the Convention's
liability limitations unenforceable.210 In addition, use of the SDR to con-
vert Convention.judgments is consistent with a recent trend among the
Warsaw parties to adopt SDRs for converting Convention judgments in
the parties' national courts. Since uniformity is one of the principal goals
of the Convention, American courts often have considered the practices
of other signatories when applying provisions of the Warsaw Convention.1
2
Although use of the SDR to convert Convention judgments may depart
from the Convention's language, courts may use the SDR since applica-
tion of the SDR effectuates the modern purposes of the Convention.21
Since the Senate has not terminated the United States' adherence
to the Warsaw Convention, courts in the United States must still enforce
the Convention's liability limitation provisions.1 4 Until the parties to the
Convention adopt a uniform standard or until Congress acts affirmative-
ly, American courts must attempt to adopt consistent units of conversion."
Although the courts may have difficulty adopting a standard unit of con-
version, the courts should not follow the Franklin Mint 11 and Kimpo
courts' decisions that Article 22 is unenforceable because courts do not
have the authority under the Constitution to affect changes in the essen-
tial provisions of treaties."6 Instead, courts should use the SDR to calculate
See Articles, supra note 13, art. 15 (IMF's Articles provide for replacement of gold
with SDR as international unit of conversion); Gold interview, supra note 182 (SDR logical
conversion unit for purposes of Article 22 because SDR will replace gold as internationally
approved conversion unit).
"I' See supra note 33 and accompanying text (Montreal Conference determined that
SDR was logical unit of conversion for Article 22 because application of SDR produced
stable liability limitations).
2.1 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (countries that have adopted SDRs
as basis for converting Convention judgments into national currencies).
21 See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978) (court
looked to opinions of other Warsaw signatories to insure uniform application of Conven-
tion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d
323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967) (courts obliged to keep interpretation of Warsaw Convention
as uniform as possible with interpretations of other signatories), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 405
(1968)
212 See supra note 207 (list of foreign courts that have determined application of SDR
best effectuates Convention's purpose of providing stable and uniform liability limitations).
214 See supra note 9 & 158-67 and accompanying text (courts have constitutional respon-
sibility to enforce treaties that Senate has ratified).
211 See supra notes 9 & 36 and accompanying text (courts must select proper unit of
conversion because Warsaw parties have not amended Article 22 to take account of change
in gold's status)
16 See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (Franklin Mint I1 court lacked authority
for holding Article 22 unenforceable); see also supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text
(Franklin Mint II; supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (Kimpo).
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carriers' liability since use of the SDR provides a modern day interpreta-
tion of the Convention.217 A less desirable but also legitimate conversion
factor is the last official price of gold.218 American courts that are hesitant
to use the SDR because use of the SDR departs from the Convention's
language can follow the Warsaw Crash and Deere holdings and utilize the
last official gold price to limit carriers' liability.219 Consistent application
of either the last official gold price or the SDR fulfills the United States'
obligation to observe requirements of the Convention and thus insures
that both passengers and carriers receive the benefits of the uniform
system of liability provided by the Warsaw Convention.
JAMES DAVID SIMPSON, JR.
21" See supra notes 206-13 'and accompanying text (American courts can use SDR to
convert Convention judgments).
18 See supra notes 112-30 and accompanying text (use of last official gold price effec-
tuates purpose of Convention better than does use of free market gold price).
"I8 See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (Deere); supra notes 98-111 and accom-
panying text (Warsaw Crash); see also supra notes 112-30 (last official gold price preferable
conversion unit than free market gold price).
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